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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
THREE ESSAYS ON WELFARE POLICIES IN AMERICAN STATES: 
EXPLAINING AMERICAN WELFARE STATES IN THE  
POST-WELFARE REFORM ERA 
This dissertation consists of three empirical studies that address questions 
regarding state welfare policy making in the post-welfare reform era. The first empirical 
study pays close attention to the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) as a 
federal block grant program, which is a big departure from most previous TANF studies, 
to ask why American states differ in their decisions to allocate federal block grants across 
specific programs. Drawing on research on fiscal federalism and state and cross-national 
welfare politics, the study uses cross-sectional time-series data covering 50 states over 
the fiscal years 2004-2016 to examine factors that have an impact on state child care 
spending under the TANF block grant. The results show that several political factors and 
one socio-economic factor impact states’ TANF child care spending in the hypothesized 
direction. Most importantly, the study finds that a specific state government’s TANF 
policy designed to encourage work matters in an interesting way. States’ emphasis on 
work of TANF recipients, measured by the existence of the TANF job-search rule, exerts 
a positive, independent effect on the percentage of state TANF child care spending, but 
the positive marginal effect of implementing the job-search rule becomes negative as the 
percentage of female state legislators passes 28%. The study shed lights on our general 
understanding of the factors that influence state allocations of federal block grants for an 
understudied but increasingly important policy program in the American states—child 
care. 
The second empirical study examines whether the selection of indicators of 
welfare policy commitment makes any difference for the findings in studies of the 
determinants of state welfare policy. If so, what difference does it make? While scholars 
of state welfare politics have long been making efforts to find better explanations for 
variation in welfare policy across American states, the literature as a whole has paid little 
attention to how differently scholars operationalize state welfare policy even though they 
examine a variety of welfare policy measures. To address these questions, I estimate a 
series of different panel data models with different measures of state welfare commitment 
for the period after the welfare reform of 1996. Comparing the results across these 
models shows that the choice of dependent variable measures affects the estimation 
results, thereby suggesting that empirical findings are dependent upon the measure we 
use. This finding not only shows that scholars need to be cautious in interpreting their 
results but also opens up a new puzzle as to why a factor affects a particular welfare 
measure but not others.  
The last empirical study addresses the question: do the effects of party politics 
differ across welfare policies? In answering this question, the study draws on the 
literature on deservingness and social construction of target populations and hypothesizes 
that party politics would play a differential role in explaining the generosity of different 
welfare policies depending on the perceived deservingness of target populations. To test 
this hypothesis, I estimate three models each for TANF, Supplemental Security Income-
State Supplements (SSI-S), and Medicaid generosity covering the period after the welfare 
reform. I find that party politics still remains as an important predictor of state welfare 
generosity, especially where welfare policy for the deserving poor and mixed population 
in terms of its deservingness is concerned. Also, there are differential effects of party 
politics across the welfare policies examined, but sometimes in an unexpected direction. 
This study provides a valuable addition to the literature in that it updates and enriches our 
understanding of welfare politics. 
KEYWORDS: TANF Child Care Spending, Welfare Measures, Welfare Commitment 
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This dissertation aims to contribute to our understanding of state welfare policy 
making in the post-welfare reform era by broadening the limited scope of scrutiny in the 
existing literature. The passage of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) has provided scholars a great opportunity to 
examine the consequences of rendering states a wide discretion over designing and 
implementing welfare programs, resulting in many studies over the past 20 years. Despite 
this, however, the welfare scholarship has left out some important aspects in the realm of 
welfare research. Paying attention to where relatively scarce attention has been made, all 
three papers in the dissertation examine variation in welfare policy across American 
states while providing a different focus in each paper. 
In Chapter 2, I pay attention to the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) program and examine what factors explain the variation across states in the 
emphasis on child care under TANF. To address this question, I estimate the model using 
panel data covering 50 states over FY 2004-FY 2016 while paying particular attention to 
the role of TANF policy and its interaction with the presence of female legislators in a 
state. The analysis in the chapter extends the TANF scholarship in two ways. First, 
recognizing that the previous scholarship has not evaluated TANF as a block grant 
program, this study focuses on child care as one of the important spending categories 
under TANF and asks why American states differ in their decisions to allocate TANF 
funds to child care. Second, I turn our attention to TANF policy as one of the possible 
factors explaining the TANF output. Scholars have focused on variation in TANF policy 
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across states as the phenomenon to be explained, but not a factor that could lead to 
variation in the way states use TANF block grants. Therefore, I test whether the presence 
of a job-search requirement for TANF cash benefit determines the percentage of total 
federal and state TANF expenditures used for child care. 
In Chapter 3, I investigate whether the choice of one state welfare commitment 
measure instead of another as a dependent variable changes the results in analyses. This 
question has not been discussed in the literature, but it is a fundamental question that can 
have important implications for both state welfare policy making and the welfare politics 
scholarship. Answering this question proceeds with the following three steps. I first 
review previous studies to see how scholars have operationalized state welfare policy as a 
dependent variable and whether they have found consistent findings across studies with 
regard to the most frequently studied independent variables. Next, I discuss how we 
might conceptualize welfare in the American context, which leads me to construct three 
different measures of state welfare policy commitment that reflect a different scope of 
welfare depending on how we define the concept. Finally, with these measures, I estimate 
three models using panel data covering 50 states over FY 1999-FY 2010 and compare the 
results across the models. The study in this chapter gives directions to future research by 
opening up new questions as to why a certain factor matters for a particular kind of 
welfare commitment measure but not others. 
In Chapter 4, I ask whether the effect of party politics differs across welfare 
policies, paying particular attention to the perceived deservingness of target populations 
and its implication for state welfare generosity. I hypothesize that the influence of party 
competition and party control on the generosity of welfare policies will differ depending 
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on the perceived deservingness of target populations. I test this hypothesis with three 
welfare policies serving different target populations—i.e., TANF, Supplemental Security 
Income-State Supplements (SSI-S), and Medicaid—and compare the results. This chapter 
updates and expands the existing literature by addressing the old debate regarding party 
politics and its relationship to state welfare policymaking. Concluding the dissertation, 





DO GOVERNMENT POLICIES MATTER? 
STATE CHILD CARE SPENDING UNDER THE 
TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES PROGRAM 
2.1   Introduction 
Why do states differ in their allocations of federal block grants to specific 
programs? Students of fiscal federalism have long been interested in how states use 
federal money rendered in the form of a block grant and how such programs influence 
state policies and outcomes. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996, also known as the 1996 Welfare Reform Act, 
instituted a federal block grant called Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 
providing scholars ample opportunity to examine why states allocate funds differently. 
However, aside from a few descriptive studies (Schott, Floyd, & Burnside, 2019), little 
research attempts to explain the variation in TANF funding allocations across the states. 
Instead, most scholarly interest has focused on explaining differences in total state TANF 
spending (Ewalt & Jennings, 2014; Rodgers & Tedin, 2006), the stringency of states’ 
TANF policies for benefits, eligibility, and sanctions (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Filindra, 
2002; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2001; Zedlewski, 1998) and variation in state 
TANF policy outputs such as TANF children coverage or TANF cash generosity (Bentele 
& Nicoli, 2012; Brunch, Meyers, & Gornick, 2018). 
One important allocation choice involves the decision about child care spending. 
Understanding TANF spending on child care across states and over time is important for 
several reasons. The federal government and the states have put much more emphasis on 
supporting child care with TANF funds since the passage of the welfare reform act 
5 
 
(Waldfogel, 2001). In fact, child care for low-income families is stated as one of the core 
welfare reform areas together with basic assistance for families with children and work-
related activities or supports. Because TANF changed the emphasis from stay-at-home 
parenting in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program to working 
as a requirement for receiving benefits, the provision of child care is a major issue for 
moving people from assistance to work. From the point of view of the welfare recipient, 
child care is such an important aspect of TANF because welfare recipients, mostly single-
mother families, have difficulties seeking employment and securing child care at the 
same time. Provision of child care can help recipients transition off welfare and make a 
living.  
The growing share spent on child care over time demonstrates that child care is an 
important and timely issue; child care spending in total TANF funds almost doubled from 
9.3 % in FY 1998 to 17 % in FY 2016 (U.S. HHS, 2019). Despite its growing 
importance, however, the U.S. governments provide relatively little public assistance for 
child care compared to many industrialized countries in Western Europe (Lokteff & 
Piercy, 2012; Ng, 2006; White, 2009). Average total public spending on child care and 
early childhood education of 32 OECD countries is 0.7% of GDP, while the U.S. 
governments spend only 0.35 % of GDP. Among 31 OECD countries, the U.S. ranked 
29th on this measure as of 2013 (OECD, 2016). Also, when only public child care 
spending is compared, the U.S. is ranked at the bottom among the 23 OECD countries 
compared (OECD, 2016).   
Although more than 20 years have passed since the PRWORA was enacted, the 
question of how different states allocate TANF funds to child care has received little 
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scholarly attention. The lack of attention is surprising because state governments are key 
players in deciding how federal block grant funds under TANF are allocated. With 
greater flexibility given to states, it was foreseeable that states would allocate and use 
TANF funds in a varying manner. Figure 2.1 displays the trend in the percentage of 
TANF funding spent on child care in five states. One can observe tremendous variation in 
the way states spend TANF funds to child care over time. For example, Kansas and Idaho 
spent a similar proportion of TANF funds on child care in FY 2004, 15.5% and 15.4%, 
respectively. However, child care spending over the next 13 years proceeded along a very 
different trajectory in these two states, with Kansas reducing such spending to 4.3% in 
FY 2013 while Idaho was increasing that spending to 27.1% in the same year. The 
dramatic differences raise the question of what accounts for such wide variation across 
states over time in their TANF spending on child care.  
Drawing from research on fiscal federalism and state and cross-national welfare 
politics, I develop several hypotheses about how different types of factors should 
influence state TANF spending on child care and why some states would spend more 
than others on child care over the time period examined. By studying TANF child care 
spending, this research not only contributes to our general understanding of the factors 
that influence different state spending of federal block grants, but also more specifically 
our understanding of an understudied but increasingly important policy program in the 
American states—child care. More specifically, this study examines the power of various 
factors that influence state TANF child care spending with an emphasis on state TANF 




Figure 2.1  The share of TANF funds spent on child care in five states, FY 2004-FY 2016 
Note: The Y-axis represents the proportion of state TANF funds spent on child care, and the X-axis represents 
fiscal years.  
Source: The authors' calculation based on Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) TANF data and 
TANF expenditure data collected by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHH).  
2.2   Why do States Differ in Their Welfare Policies and Spending? 
2.2.1   Political and Socio-Economic Factors 
State welfare politics literature has mainly payed attention to two groups of 
factors to explain variation in welfare policies across states: political and socio-economic 
variables. States’ TANF child care spending can be also thought of as governments’ 
response to different kinds of political and socio-economic conditions that are generally 
outside of state governments’ direct control. First, students of state welfare politics have 
examined citizen’s policy preferences or broad ideological orientation as a driving force 
8 
 
of variation and changes in state policy. A few scholars find that this political force from 
below is one of the critical factors that influence welfare policy and the level of welfare 
expenditures in states (Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1993; Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; 
Filindra 2012; Ringquist, Hill, Leighley, & Hinton-Andersson, 1997; Soss et al., 2001). 
Implicit in the argument that state governments respond to preferences of their citizens is 
that state governments make policy choices in a democratic political system in which 
state citizens elect state policy makers who are expected to represent citizens’ policy 
preferences (Powell, 2004). A few studies test this democratic responsiveness of 
government by looking at the correspondence between state public ideology and the 
ideological leaning of state public policy. Among others, Erikson and his colleagues, 
using a composite measure of eight policies issues including AFDC, make a convincing 
argument that public opinion is important and is even a more important factor than 
socioeconomic factors in explaining state policy choices. They argue that the electoral 
process works to transform citizens’ policy preferences into state policy; a more liberal 
public ideology leads to more liberal state policies under certain conditions (Erikson et 
al., 1993). Several subsequent studies also found a positive association between state 
citizens’ ideology and state welfare policy (Ewalt & Jennings, 2014; Fellow & Rowe, 
2004; Ringquist et al., 1997; Soss et al., 2001).  
The ideological leaning of state governments—i.e., state governments’ ideology 
or the partisan control of government— is another widely examined political factor that 
has been found to impact state welfare policy making. Although scholars do not agree on 
how to operationalize these concepts (Brown, 1995; Smith, 1997), they nevertheless 
matter. Liberal state governments tend to be more generous in assisting the poor than 
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their conservative counterparts, in part, because they are elected by more liberal 
constituents. Consequently, they spend more welfare money, allocate greater benefits, 
and have less restrictive benefit eligibility rules (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Flavin, 2015; 
Hill & Leighly, 1992; Rom, 1999; Smith, 1997; Soss et al., 2001).  
Also, both state-level and cross-national studies show evidence that female 
legislators tend to give more priority to women’s interests and voice liberal opinions on a 
wide array of issues compared to their male counterparts (Barrett, 1995; CAWP, 2001; 
Poggione, 2004; Reingold & Smith, 2012; Thomas & Welch, 1991; Welch, 1985). 
Gender differences in legislators’ policy preferences come from different experiences and 
responsibilities women have in their private sphere (Mandel & Dodson, 1993). 
Poggione’s (2004) study, which uses survey data to examine welfare policy preferences 
of female and male state legislators, shows that female legislators are more likely to hold 
liberal preferences on welfare policy than their counterparts. Investigating states’ TANF 
policy adoption following the welfare reform, Payne (2013) finds that states with higher 
percentage of female legislators are likely to create a more progressive welfare 
environment than those with lower percentage of female legislators. Moreover, 
Hawkesworth and her colleagues document that female legislators made efforts to expand 
the proposed PRWORA to include child care provisions in the process of drafting and 
developing the bill (Hawkesworth, Casey, Jenkins, & Kleeman, 2001). 
Socio-economic factors compose a second group of factors that scholars consider 
in explaining variation in state welfare policy. A functionalist argument that societal 
needs for welfare are associated with an expansion of welfare programs is well received 
in the welfare development literature. Focusing on variation in welfare service provision 
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in post-industrial democracies, comparative national studies demonstrate that new social 
needs give rise to an expansion of welfare programs (Bonoli & Reber, 2010; Wilensky, 
1975). Scholars consider this factor in the American states’ context as well, but with two 
conflicting expectations. While some scholars hypothesize that social needs should be 
positively associated with state welfare policy (Fry & Winter, 1970), others predict that 
states may get tougher to counter the growing welfare dependency in their states with less 
generous welfare policy (Soss et al., 2001). Based on these contradictory arguments, 
Fellowes and Rowe (2004) posit that social needs could have either positive or negative 
influence on state welfare policy. Findings from these studies are mixed, but overall 
suggest that societal needs matter for welfare policy in the states. Whereas Soss et al. 
(2001) only find a partial support for their thesis, Fry and Winters (1970) and Fellowes 
and Rowe (2004) find evidence to support the positive influence of social needs factors 
on state welfare policy. Fellowes and Rowe (2004) show that states respond to a higher 
level of welfare needs by providing more generous cash benefits and implementing less 
restrictive eligibility policy. They argue that their findings on welfare demand indicate 
that policy makers react compassionately toward those in need of assistance.  
Many studies investigate the racial composition of state population or welfare 
recipients as an important predictor of welfare policy across states. Since Wright (1977) 
first found the backlash effect of African-American state population on AFDC 
generosity, numerous studies have tested whether the backlash effect is also present in 
different policy contexts (Avery & Peffley, 2005; Bentele & Nicoli, 2012; Matsubayashi 
& Rocha, 2012; Reingold & Smith, 2012; Soss et al., 2001). The negative relationship 
between black population or black welfare recipients and state welfare policy is found 
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both in pre 1996 welfare reform (Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003; Brown, 1995; Plotnick & 
Winters, 1985) and post 1996 welfare reform era (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Reingold & 
Smith, 2012; Soss et al., 2001). Also, a study that examines the period that spans before 
and after the welfare reform in 1996 reports that the size of black population has a 
negative impact on state total welfare expenditures (Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012). 
These findings regarding each of these political and socio-economic forces lead us to 
expect that variations in citizen ideology, government ideology, female legislators, 
societal needs, and the proportion of racial minorities among TANF recipients will affect 
the spending of TANF funds. 
2.2.2   A Missing Piece: State TANF Policies as State Policy Intentions 
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 
(PRWORA) devolved program authority to state governments, which created a policy 
environment where states could perform as laboratories of democracy. Therefore, the 
passage of welfare reform triggered much scholarly interest in state welfare politics, 
particularly focusing on state TANF policies, such as eligibility and sanctioning rules and 
cash benefit levels. Central to this interest has been seeking an answer to the question of 
why some states adopt more generous TANF policies than other states. However, only a 
few studies focus on spending aspects of the TANF block grant (Ewalt & Jennings, 2014; 
Rodgers & Tedin, 2006), and those studies are limited in the following respects. First, 
these studies examine cross-state variation in a highly aggregated level of TANF 
expenditures—i.e., total TANF expenditures used by states, but do not look at categories 
or subcategories under the TANF block grant. Investigating TANF spending as a whole 
might show us a general picture of why total TANF spending varies across states. 
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However, since expenditure categories on which states spend TANF money are not 
identical in the proportion of TANF spending allocated to the category, lumping TANF 
funds together obscures what might matter for a particular spending category, such as 
child care spending. Second and more importantly, previous studies that examine TANF 
spending levels tend to ignore the effect of state TANF policies on policy output. State 
TANF policies are examined exclusively as dependent variables, but previous studies do 
not consider the possibility of state TANF policies having an impact on the pattern of 
state TANF expenditures.1  
Findings from the literature on the effects of federal block grants on state 
spending show that states do shape the distribution of grants in a certain direction 
(Fossett, 1987; Jacobsen & McGuire, 1996; Morgan & England, 1984). Also, studies 
buttress this finding by showing that states’ TANF policies vary in terms of generosity to 
welfare recipients and that state TANF policy designs reflect the intentions of policy 
makers in response to growing caseloads (Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Soss et al., 2001). 
These findings suggest, therefore, leaving out state TANF policies from a model would 
provide an incomplete story as to why states vary in their support for a particular program 
or a level of spending under a federal block grant. As states have great latitude to design 
their TANF programs and tailor their welfare spending to the particular needs of the state, 
state TANF policies represent intentions of state policy makers. For example, state 
governments could use welfare policy as an instrument to discourage citizens’ behavior 
that is considered counter-normative, such as welfare dependency (Gans, 1995; Handler, 
                                                 
1 While Rodgers and Tedin (2006) suggest that strict TANF policy has influence on state TANF tax effort 




1995). Therefore, examining underlying state policy intentions as an explanatory factor 
would provide a more comprehensive explanation of variation across state welfare 
policy—in this case, TANF child care spending—over time. In this paper, I incorporate a 
state TANF policy that is relevant to TANF child care spending as a possible explanatory 
variable, emphasizing more intentional and active use of welfare policy by states. 
In this regard, this study contributes to the literature on state welfare policy by 
looking at a relatively neglected aspect of the TANF block grant by focusing on TANF 
child care spending. TANF child care spending is worthy of scholars’ attention, given 
that (1) TANF child care spending level ranks the second highest among other categories 
of spending under the TANF block grant and (2) that child care support can be critical to 
welfare recipients’ efforts to improve their family’s well-being and attain self-sufficiency.2 
2.3   Explaining TANF Child Care Spending Across the States 
This section develops several hypotheses about the factors that influence TANF 
child care spending in the states. The passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA or the Personal Responsibility Act) was a 
watershed moment in the history of American welfare policy. Passing with a relatively 
high degree of bipartisan support, the Personal Responsibility Act aimed to “end welfare 
as we know it” by addressing critical issues that have been a focus of debate about 
welfare in America. To this end, the legislation replaced the federal Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children (AFDC) program—the primary cash assistance program for low-
income families—with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
                                                 
2 Next to spending on basic assistance, which comprises 24% of the total federal and state TANF fund, 
child care spending amounts to 17% of the total at the aggregate level in FY 2016 (Schott et al., 2019). 
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program—a state-managed block grant. One central component that distinguishes TANF 
from previous welfare policy is that, in response to the criticism that governments’ 
welfare programs were increasing dependency instead of encouraging work, it puts heavy 
emphasis on work and self-sufficiency. Therefore, the legislation set firm time limits on 
welfare receipt, established work requirements, and allowed state governments to impose 
much stricter work and work activity requirements in the hope of moving welfare 
recipients toward employment. At the same time, states implemented a variety of services 
to promote work, including education programs, job-search, and child care support.  
Previous studies suggest that different levels of state welfare spending reflect 
varying degrees of response to political and socio-economic forces (Ewalt & Jennings, 
2014; Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Rodgers & Tedin, 2006). First, previous literature finds 
that a more liberal citizen ideology leads to a higher level of spending on welfare 
programs (Ewalt & Jennings, 2014). However, the current study cannot directly draw on 
this finding because whether spending on child care denotes more welfare than spending 
on all other spending categories under the TANF block grant is not straightforward. For 
example, comparing child care spending and basic cash assistance spending, it is not 
clear which one reflects a more liberal choice. However, public opinion studies find that 
the more conservative citizens are, the more they tend to oppose an increase in 
government spending on child care (Henderson, Monroe, Garand, & Burts, 1995). This 
empirical finding suggests that states with a more liberal citizen ideology should be 
expected to spend more TANF money on child care than states with a more conservative 
ideology, which leads to the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: On average, states with a more liberal citizen ideology will spend a 
higher proportion of total TANF spending on child care than more conservative 
states. 
As more conservative citizens oppose more support for child care (Henderson et 
al., 1995), we can expect that more liberal governments that represent more liberal 
citizens’ preferences will spend more TANF funds on child care than less liberal 
governments. In addition, the fact that it was Democratic politicians not Republicans who 
support funding child care with TANF money buttresses the above-stated expectation 
(Cohen, 2001, p. 180). Therefore, the second hypothesis follows:  
Hypothesis 2: On average, state governments with a more liberal ideology will 
spend a higher proportion of TANF on child care than states with a more 
conservative government ideology. 
Many studies on women in state legislatures argue that female legislators are 
more likely than their male counterparts to express interest in representing women’s 
interests. In a study of OECD countries, Bonoli and Reber (2010) found that female 
representation in the national legislative body significantly and positively influenced 
public spending on child care services. This study suggests that greater representation of 
women in a policy making body will push states to spend more TANF funds on child 
care, stated more formally in the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: On average, states with a higher percentage of women in state 
legislatures will spend a higher proportion of total TANF spending on child care 
than states with a lower percentage of female legislators.   
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Not only political forces but also societal needs are expected to influence TANF 
spending on child care. With the increasing degree of maternal employment, policy 
makers have been concerned that child care costs create a barrier to employment, 
particularly for single mothers and low-skilled workers. This concern spurred a 
considerable increase in public funding for child care assistance (Meyers, Heintze, & 
Wolf, 2002). As a major welfare program that emphasizes “welfare-to-work”, TANF 
programs are designed to promote employment of welfare recipients, and the TANF 
block grant spent for child care is to support parents who work (non-assistance child care 
spending) or seek work (assistance child care spending). Therefore, if a state observes 
more need for child care support, the state would invest more on it.  
This study uses three indicators to measure societal needs: unemployment rate, 
unwed birth rate, and poverty rate. On the one hand, a higher unemployment rate in states 
could lead to lower spending on child care as unemployment rate being high means fewer 
women in the work force and less demand for labor which means there is less need for 
child care assistance. On the other hand, it is likely that state governments push people to 
work or work activity when the unemployment rate is low, trying to ease the pressures of 
employers hiring workers in a tighter labor market (Soss et al., 2001), which would be 
associated with higher spending on child care. A higher unwed birth rate indicates more 
need for child care support. Single mothers are more likely to be in poverty; thus, they 
need to look for jobs or participate in economic activities and are less capable of paying 
for child care themselves. Therefore, this study posits the following hypotheses. 
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Hypothesis 4-a: On average, states with a higher unemployment rate will have a 
lower proportion of TANF child care spending in total TANF spending than those 
with lower unemployment rates. 
Hypothesis 4-b: On average, states with a higher poverty rate will have a higher 
proportion of TANF child care spending in total TANF spending than those with 
lower poverty rates. 
Hypothesis 4-c: On average, states with a higher unwed birth rate will have a higher 
proportion of TANF child care spending in total TANF spending than those with 
lower unwed birth rates. 
Many scholars find evidence of racism as an explanation for state welfare policy 
choices (Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003; Brown, 1995; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012; 
Wright, 1977). Moreover, post welfare reform studies also report that states with a higher 
percentage of African-American TANF recipients are less generous on welfare provisions 
(Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Soss et al., 2001). Therefore, I expect that this biased attitude 
toward black recipients would be applied to the case of TANF child care spending.  
Hypothesis 5-a: On average, states with a higher percentage of African-Americans 
among total TANF recipients will have a lower proportion of TANF child care 
spending in total TANF spending than those with a lower percentage of African-
American TANF recipients.   
Hypothesis 5-b: On average, states with a higher percentage of Hispanics among 
total TANF recipients will have a lower proportion of TANF child care spending in 
total TANF spending than those with a lower percentage of Hispanic TANF recipients.   
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I argue that state TANF policies would have an impact on TANF outputs; in 
particular, how states spend their TANF funds. States administer TANF funds applying a 
variety of TANF policies (or rules), and these policies shape their TANF programs, 
reflecting state intentions to make people behave in certain ways by implementing those 
policies. As a greater percentage of TANF child care spending means more state effort to 
facilitate employment, in other words, to discourage welfare dependency, this study 
expects that the design and implementation of state TANF programs that put more 
emphasis on work will lead to greater spending on TANF child care. Among several 
candidates that could be used as an indicator of states’ TANF policy orientation regarding 
an emphasis on work, this study utilizes data on a TANF policy that indicates whether a 
job-search is required to be eligible for TANF in a given state. This policy reflects states’ 
policy intentions trying to encourage participation in the job market, which should, in 
turn, increase state TANF spending on child care. States with this policy in place are 
expected to spend more on child care than their counterparts. Therefore, this study posits 
the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 6: On average, states that require a job-search to be eligible for TANF 
will spend a higher proportion of TANF on child care than states that do not require 
a job-search. 
Meanwhile, I expect that there is an interaction between the job-search rule and 
female legislators. Depending on assumptions I make on how women legislators would 
perceive the job-search rule, I posit two contradictory hypotheses. On the one hand, 
women legislators might think the job-search rule as a policy design that increases the 
demand for child care by emphasizing work, so they would exert more influence to 
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increase spending on child care in the presence of such a rule. In this scenario, the 
presence of job-search rule reinforces the effect of female legislators; also, female 
legislators augment the effect of job-search rule. On the other hand, women legislators 
might consider the job-search rule an institutional design that naturally increases TANF 
spending on child care. In this case, they become relatively less attentive to supporting 
child care need and thus motivation to increase child care spending is weakened. 
Therefore, the presence of such rule would negate the effect of women legislators on 
TANF child care spending. In the same vein, the effect of the job-search rule should 
decrease when women legislator presence becomes stronger. Therefore, the two 
hypotheses that follows are:  
Hypothesis 7-a: On average, the impact of having a higher percentage of women 
legislators in states will increase when states have the job-search rule; the impact of 
the job-search rule will increase when there is a higher percentage of women 
legislators.   
Hypothesis 7-b: On average, the impact of having a higher percentage of women 
legislators in states will decrease when state have the job-search rule; the impact of 
the job-search rule will decrease when there is a higher percentage of women 
legislators. 
To test these hypotheses, I use panel data in 50 states from FY 2004 to FY 2016. 
The following section discusses the dependent and independent variables and how I 
operationalize the variables for the empirical test proposed in this study.  
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2.4   Data and Measures 
This study employs a regression analysis using panel data in 50 states for FY 
2004-FY 2016 to examine the factors that influence state spending on child care under 
the TANF block grant. While TANF financial data is available from late 1990’s, the data 
availability for one control variable—i.e., Child Care Development Fund (CCDF) 
Spending—restricts the time period of the study to start from FY 2004. I conduct the 
analysis including dummies for each state and year. By including state dummy variables, 
I assume that some invariant characteristics within the states may impact the independent 
and the dependent variables. We can think of state culture as an example of a time-
invariant characteristic of states, with women in some states traditionally being more 
likely to seek employment than in other states, which likely affects the outcome variable. 
In addition, by including year dummies in the model, I intentionally remove the impact of 
certain events that influence TANF child care spending across the board in most states. 
For example, inclusion of year dummies controls the impact of the American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009. Through ARRA, the federal government 
rendered an additional $5 billion in emergency contingency funds to states in 2009 and 
2010, which increased TANF funds available for all states. Therefore, the regression 
coefficients presented are the estimates controlling for both state and year fixed effects. 
They reflect the degree of influence for each factor on the percentage of state TANF child 
care spending, controlling for other independent variables, unobserved national time 
trends, and invariant but unobserved state-specific characteristics within states. 
TANF Child Care Spending is the dependent variable that measures the 
percentage of total federal and state TANF expenditures used for child care by each state 
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in each fiscal year.3 States can spend the TANF funds, which consist of federal and state 
funds, on 22 categories of activities, and the categories can be grouped into a higher level 
of categories as shown in Table 2.1.4 In this study, I include 1) direct child care spending 
used with federal and state funds and 2) transfers of federal TANF funds to the Child 
Care Development Fund (CCDF) to measure child care spending under TANF programs. 
The CCDF is a primary federal fund that provides child care subsidies to low income 
working families. The federal government limits CCDF transfers to 30 percent of total 
federal TANF funds.5 Theoretically, the measure of TANF child care spending ranges 
from 0 to 100, but in reality the percentages range from -13.61 to 68.72. Since states are 
allowed to make negative adjustment to previous expenditures, negative spending can 
show up in TANF financial documents (Schott, Pavetti, & Floyd, 2015). Negative 
spending reflects that there are changes in funding streams, funds are recovered from a 
program, or funds are retrieved back from the CCDF to TANF (CBPP, n.d.). 
The results presented in the main text are from the data set that treats negative 
values as they are.6 Assuming that there could be mistakes in data entry by administrative 
staff (of state, federal offices, or both), I winsorize and truncate extreme values of the 
dependent variable at 1 and 99 percentiles respectively to reduce the effect of possible 
                                                 
3 The data for this measure are from the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP) (CBPP, 2015) and 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The CBPP categorizes the TANF expenditure data 
into a set of sub-categories using the data collected by the Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) and released through the Office of Family Assistance (OFA) website. The OFA is one of the offices 
in the Administration for Children and Families that administers TANF programs. 
4 State governments are required to submit a Form ACF-196 to the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services each year on which they report how they spent the TANF block grant in these 22 categories of 
spending. 
5 A state can transfer federal TANF funds to Social Security Block Grant (SSBG) up to 10 percent of its 
TANF funds. However, CCDF transfer together with SSBG transfer may not exceed 30 percent of a states’ 
current year block grant. 
6 The panel data include five observations that have negative values for TANF Child Care Spending for 
Arizona, Colorado (twice), Georgia, and South Dakota, in four different years from FY 2006 to FY 2014. 
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Table 2.1  Categories of TANF Spending 
Federal Reporting Category a Authors’ Category 
Basic Assistance  Basic Assistance 
Child Care b  
Assistance  
Child Care (Spent or Transferred) Non-Assistance 
Transferred to CCDF 
Transportation and Other Supportive Services 





Education and Training 




Individual Development Accounts 
Refundable Earned Income Tax Credit 
Refundable Tax Credit 
Other Refundable Tax Credit 
Authorized Solely 
Under Prior Law 
Assistance 
Authorized Under Prior Law & 
Other Non-Assistance Non-assistance 
Other Non-Assistance 
Administration 
Administration & Systems 
Systems 
Prevention of Out of Wedlock Pregnancies Prevention of Out of Wedlock 
Pregnancies &  Two-Parent Family 
Formation and Maintenance Two-Parent Family Formation and Maintenance 
Transferred to SSBG Transferred to SSBG 
Non-Recurrent Short-Term Benefits Non-Recurrent Short-Term Benefits 
a. The Federal reporting category is slightly modified from FY 2015. However, since child care spending 
and transfer to CCDF category exist as they used to be, the change in the reporting category does not affect 
the way I generate child care category for the analysis. 
b. All categories of spending except transferred fund to CCDF and Social Security Block Grant (SSBG) can 
be classified as either assistance or non-assistance spending. Child care assistance is provided to families 
that are not employed but participating in other work activities such as job-search, education, or training. 
Child care non-assistance includes child care support for families who are employed, and that provided as a 
non-recurrent, short-term benefit. 
outliers made by chance, and discuss the results in Table A.2 in the Appendix A. To be 
succinct, the main findings are robust to these changes to the dependent variable.  
State TANF Policy is the main independent variable that captures whether a state 
emphasizes work in its TANF policy design. This study uses a TANF rule that indicates 
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whether a job-search is required either before or while their application is processed as a 
condition to be eligible for aid in a given state as of July of each year. The variable takes 
on a value of 1 if a state requires job-search, and 0 otherwise. Not only does this measure 
vary across states, it also varies over time as states sometimes change their TANF 
policies.7 
The political factors are as follows. Government Liberalism: This indicates the 
relative liberalism of a state government. For this measure, I use Berry, Fording, 
Ringquist, Hanson, and Klarner’s (2010) NOMINATE measure of state government 
ideology, which indicates how close to the left state legislators and governors stand on 
the ideological continuum. It ranges from 0 to 100, with larger values indicating a more 
liberal government ideology. Citizen Liberalism: This is an independent variable that 
measures the relative liberalism of citizens in each state. The data for this variable comes 
from the revised citizen ideology series of Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson’s 
(1998) study, which covers the period 1960-2016.8 It ranges from 0 to 100, with larger 
numbers reflecting a more liberal citizen ideology. Female Legislators: This variable 
indicates to what extent women are represented in state legislatures, which is measured as 
the percentage of seats occupied by women in the state legislatures.9  
Socio-economic factors include three societal need variables and two racial 
variables. First, societal needs are measured by the following: Unemployment Rate, 
Poverty Rate, and Unwed Birth Rate. Unemployment Rate: It represents the annual 
                                                 
7 The data on this TANF rule are available from the Urban Institute website (http://anfdata.urban.org/wrd). 
8 The data are available in Richard C. Fording’s personal website (https://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-
ideology-data/). 
9 The data for this measure are taken from the Center for American Women and Politics’ (CAWP) annual 




average percentage of people aged 16 and older in employment in each state.10 Poverty 
Rate: This variable measures the percentage of people living under a poverty threshold 
defined by the Census Bureau. Unwed Birth Rate: It is measured as the proportion of all 
births born to unwed women in each state, which also captures societal needs for child 
care.11 Next, I take into account African-American Recipients and Hispanic Recipients to 
examine the probable impact of race on state TANF child care spending. These variables 
measure the percentage of African-American TANF recipients and that of Hispanic 
TANF recipients in total TANF recipients in each state.12  
In addition to the above predictors, this study includes the following two control 
variables. TANF Caseload Change: This variable accounts for the varying degree of 
increase or decrease in TANF caseloads across states and years. Studies report that states 
were able to save TANF funds in the years after welfare reform due to a significant drop 
in TANF rolls. Therefore, states are able to redirect TANF money previously spent for 
cash assistance to other areas, including child care (Pavetti & Schott, 2011). A study that 
examines transfer of TANF funds to the Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) supports 
this expectation (Lambright & Allard, 2004). The authors find that when states have more 
surpluses of TANF funds due to decreased caseloads, they are likely to transfer more 
TANF funds to SSBG. Altogether, these findings imply that a state with more TANF 
                                                 
10 The data for this measure come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unemployment 
Statistics. “States: Employment status of the civilian noninstitutional population, 1976 to 2014 annual 
averages” (https://www.bls.gov/lau/staadata.txt). 
11 The information is taken from the Kids Count Data Center (http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data). Their 
data on this variable are analyzed using data files from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
National Center for Health Statistics.  
12 The data for this measure come from TANF caseload data for each year. They are released annually 




surplus generated from reduced caseloads is also likely to spend more on child care. The 
variable is measured as the percentage change in the total number of TANF families in 
each state.13 CCDF Spending: This measures states’ child care commitment outside of 
TANF block grant. TANF families can receive child care subsidies through Child Care 
Development Fund (CCDF) which is the largest source of child care subsidies for low-
income families. It is likely that states that spend more on CCDF programs are 
systematically different from those that put less resources on the programs. Therefore, I 
include state total expenditures on CCDF programs as a control. 
Except for State TANF Policy, all the other independent variables are lagged by 
one year. As the dependent variable, TANF Child Care Spending, uses fiscal year data, it 
is more reasonable to match it with lagged independent variables. In this way, I can avoid 
a possibility of reverse causality. Table 2.2 shows descriptive statistics of variables 
estimated in this study. 
Table 2.2  Descriptive Statistics of Variables for FY 2004-FY 2016 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
TANF Child Care Spending (%) 650 17.27 12.96 -13.61 68.72 
State TANF Policy (0/1) 650 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Female Legislators (%) 650 23.54 6.94 8.20 42.00 
Citizen Liberalism (0-100) 650 51.88 15.78 13.48 94.95 
Government Liberalism (0-100) 650 46.16 15.88 17.51 73.62 
Unemployment Rate (%) 650 6.15 2.06 2.60 13.70 
Unwed Birth Rate (%) 650 38.33 6.75 17.20 55.00 
Poverty Rate (%) 650 12.84 3.25 5.40 23.10 
TANF Caseload Change (%) 650 -3.30 11.10 -43.54 53.67 
African-American Recipients (%) 650 33.66 25.75 0.79 85.55 
Hispanic Recipients (%) 650 16.00 16.81 0.17 73.30 
CCDF Spending ($1,000) 650 47,200 78,200 -28,900 1,210,000 
                                                 
13 The data from the OFA website are used to construct this variable. 
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2.5   Results 
Table 2.3 gives the empirical results from the multivariate regression analysis using 
the panel data covering 50 states over the fiscal years 2004-2016 with year and state 
dummies. Estimates from the model support some of the hypotheses. Most importantly, it 
shows that State TANF Policy and Female Legislators interact with each other to make 
differences in TANF Child Care Spending and the effect from the interaction is 
statistically significant (p<0.01). The presence of the job-search rule and the percentage 
of female legislators exert a positive, independent impact on TANF child care spending 
and they are also conditioned by each other as I expected. It turns out, in fact, that State 
TANF Policy and Female Legislators make the influence from each other less effective. 
Note that the coefficient for State TANF Policy only represents the marginal effect of the 
job-search rule when the percentage of female legislators is held constant at zero. 
Because the female legislators variable ranges approximately from 8 to 42 percent in my 
sample, holding this variable at zero does not reflect the real world. Therefore, in 
interpreting the results, we should take into account the moderating effect of Female 
Legislators on State TANF Policy instead of looking at the main effect of State TANF 
Policy. Similarly, the coefficient for Female Legislators shows the marginal effect of the 
percentage of female legislators when states do not have the job-search rule at all. 
Therefore, when we discuss the marginal effect of Female Legislators on TANF child 
care spending, the moderating effect of State TANF Policy on Female Legislators must 





Table 2.3  Determinants of State TANF Child Care Spending, FY 2004-FY 201614 
Variables Expected Direction Model 
Interaction   
State TANF Policy * Female Legislators +/− -0.38*** 
  (0.13) 
   
Government Policy   
State TANF Policy + 8.47*** 
  (2.87)    
Political Factors   
Female Legislators + 0.27** 
  (0.12) 
Citizen Liberalism + 0.12** 
  (0.05) 
Government Liberalism + 0.09*** 
  (0.03) 
   
Socio-Economic Factors   
Unemployment Rate +/− -0.55* 
  (0.30) 
Unwed Birth Rate + -0.16 
  (0.23) 
Poverty Rate + 0.19 
  (0.23) 
African-American Recipients − 0.04 
  (0.11) 
Hispanic Recipients − 0.35*** 
  (0.11) 
   
Controls   
TANF Caseload Change + -0.03 
  (0.03) 
CCDF Spending a − 6.85e-09*** 
  (2.53e-09) 
Constant  -0.45 
  (12.46)    
Observations  650 
Number of State  50 
Years  13 
R-squared  0.84 
Note: Entries are coefficients estimated from a multivariate regression model with state and year dummies. 
The dependent variable is the percentage of total federal and state TANF expenditures used for child care 
                                                 
14 One might think that competition between a state and its neighbors could play a role here. However, 
including neighbors’ effect measured as the average percentage of neighbors’ TANF child care spending in 
their total TANF funds does not make much difference in the results. The coefficient of neighbors’ effect is 
0.0003 and it is not statistically significant even with the 10% confidence level. In addition, doing so does 
not add to the variance explained by the model. 
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plus transfers to CCDF for each state in each fiscal year. All independent variables are tested against a two-
sided alternative. Except for State TANF Policy variable, all the other independent variables are lagged by 
one year. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10 
a. The coefficient for CCDF Spending is statistically significant at the 1% level, but its size is minuscule. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret the result that CCDF Spending does not have a substantive marginal 
effect on TANF Child Care Spending. 
To visualize how the marginal effect of State TANF Policy on the proportion of 
TANF child care spending changes at varying percentage of female legislators, I contrast 
in Figure 2.2 the marginal effect of State TANF Policy on the share of TANF child care 
spending at various percentage of Female Legislators with 95% confidence intervals. 
This shows what the average percentage of TANF child care spending would have been if 
all states had had the rule (and keeping the other variables constant at their means) versus 
if all states had not had the rule in place at different values of Female Legislators. As the 
percentage of female legislators increases, the marginal effect of State TANF Policy 
decreases at a rate of 0.38, meaning that 1% increase in female legislators leads to 0.38% 
decrease in TANF child care spending. However, the marginal effect of State TANF 
Policy is pronounced in states with either a higher or a lower level of women 
representation. There is a certain threshold that flips the contrast. When the percentage of 
female legislators are fewer than 16%, the marginal effect of State TANF Policy is 
positive and statistically different from zero (p<0.05); when states have more than 28% of 
female legislators, the marginal effect of State TANF Policy is negative and statistically 
significant (p<0.05). Having the job-search rule is associated with a 2.5% to 5.4% greater 
percentage of TANF child care spending when state have relatively low presence of 
female legislators, while it leads to a smaller share of TANF child care spending by 2.7% 




Figure 2.2  Marginal effects of state TANF policy conditional on female state legislators 
Note: The X-axis shows the percentage of women legislators, and the Y-axis shows the differences in state 
TANF child care spending when states have a job-search rule versus when they do not have the rule 
(baseline). The differences are statistically significant until the 95% confidence interval line touches the 
zero reference line. 
This empirical result suggests two interesting stories as to how State TANF Policy 
and Female Legislators variables interact in explaining TANF Child Care Spending. 
First, the results imply that when there is a smaller percentage of female legislators, 
which is under 16%, the presence of the job-search rule guarantees some level of child 
care spending under the TANF programs, which results in a greater percentage of child 
care spending than when there is no such rule in states. Second, the analysis shows that 
there is a certain threshold that flips the contrast. When there is a greater percentage of 
female legislators, which is approximately above 28%, the absence of the job-search 
requirement motivates women legislators to support more child care spending which is 
more than what states would spend when they have the job-search requirement. Spending 
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a higher percentage of TANF fund on child care becomes feasible because there is a 
greater percentage of female legislators who presumably vote for more child care 
spending.  
Figure 2.3 depicts the marginal effect of Female Legislators on TANF child care 
spending conditional on the presence of State TANF Policy with 95% confidence 
intervals. It shows that the marginal effect of Female Legislators is positive (β=0.27) and 
statistically significant (p<0.05) when State TANF Policy is zero, while the marginal 
effect is negative (β=-0.12) but statistically insignificant (p=-0.92) when State TANF 
Policy is one. This result indicates that 1% increase in female legislators increases the 
percentage of TANF child care spending by 0.27% when states do not have the job-
search rule; however, having the job-search rule essentially makes the influence from 
having 1% more female legislators on state TANF child care spending close to zero. In 
other words, whether or not the percentage female legislators is substantively important 
in determining state TANF child care spending depends on whether states already have 
the TANF policy that potentially increases TANF spending on child care.  
The result can be interpreted in the following two ways. It could be that the 
influence from female legislators is more effective when there is no job-search rule since 
the absence of the job-search requirement may motivate female legislators to support 
more child care spending under the TANF programs, as demonstrated by the statistically 
significant coefficient of Female Legislators (β=0.27, p<0.01). Therefore, having a 
higher percentage of female legislators leads to a higher percentage of spending on 
TANF child care when there is no job-search rule in place. In the same vein, it is likely 
that female legislators do not make extra efforts to support more child care spending  
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Figure 2.3  Marginal effects of female state legislators conditional on state TANF policy 
Note: The Y-axis shows the presence of State TANF Policy (i.e., job-search rule), and the X-axis shows the 
effect of an increase in female legislators by 1% on the percentage of state TANF child care spending. The 
marginal effect of female legislators is statistically significant if the 95% confidence interval line does not 
touch the zero reference line. 
acknowledging that there is a state TANF policy that is, by design, potentially associated 
with more state TANF spending on child care. Under the circumstances where the job-
search rule is already in place, a state having 1% more female legislators does not make 
any difference in its TANF child care spending. 
To sum, the findings suggests that State TANF Policy and Female Legislators 
substitute for each other in a rather interesting way. Having the TANF policy that 
requires recipients to search for a job leads to a greater spending on TANF child care than 
in the absence of such policy only when there are relatively few female legislators; up to 
the point where female legislators occupy 16% of state legislative seats, the marginal 
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effect of State TANT Policy is positive and decreases as the percentage of female 
legislators increases. However, when female legislators increase beyond 28% of state 
legislators, the marginal effect of State TANF Policy becomes negative and increases as 
Female Legislators increase. It means that not having the TANF policy requiring a job-
search results in a higher percentage of TANF spending on child care when the 
percentage of female legislators are relatively high. Meanwhile, the positive marginal 
impact of women’s representation in state legislatures is offset by the presence of job-
search rule. 
Other political factors—i.e., Citizen Liberalism and Government Liberalism—turn 
out to be statistically significant in the expected direction. The regression coefficient of 
Citizen Liberalism is 0.12 (p<0.05), which means that as a state’s citizens becomes more 
liberal by one point, the percentage TANF child care spending increases by 0.12% in a 
state. The regression coefficient of Government Liberalism is 0.09, which implies that as 
a state government becomes more liberal by one point, there is 0.09 % increase in the 
share of TANF child care expenditure in a state, ceteris paribus. Meanwhile, among the 
socio-economic factors, Hispanic Recipients is statistically significant (p<0.01) and has a 
positive effect as hypothesized. As a state has more Hispanic recipients of TANF by 1%, 
it is likely that it spends 0.35% more child care spending under TANF programs. It is 
important to note that none of the social need factors—i.e., Unemployment Rate, Unwed 
Birth Rate, and Poverty Rate—explains variation in state TANF child care spending.  
2.6   Concluding Remarks 
This study uses cross-sectional time-series data covering 50 states over the fiscal 
years 2004-2016 to examine the factors that influence the share of state spending on child 
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care under the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) block grant. It departs 
from most previous studies conducted since the welfare reform of 1996. First, this study 
pays attention to the nature of a block grant which renders great latitude to states to 
design their programs and spend money accordingly. While previous studies take 
advantage of the welfare reform of 1996 to investigate variations in state TANF policies 
and practices, including strictness/generosity and sanctions, I shift our attention to 
existing variations in the way states allocate and spend TANF funds, focusing on TANF 
child care spending, which is a timely social policy topic. Second, this study presents a 
mechanism through which a specific state-level TANF policy choice affects state TANF 
output. Many scholars have studied state TANF policy as a variable to be explained, but 
there has been no attempt to consider a possibility of state TANF policy having an effect 
on TANF outputs across states. Arguably, together with other factors, the policy intention 
of state governments in an attempt to shape people’s behavior in certain directions is one 
of the important factors that predicts how states spend their TANF funds. Therefore, this 
study builds a theoretical framework to take into account a state TANF policy that 
emphasizes work to examine state TANF child care spending. As states emphasize work, 
they will use resources—i.e., TANF funds—to promote work. As a result, states will 
spend more on child care under TANF. In addition, I theorize that the state TANF policy 
interacts with female legislators to increase state TANF child care spending. 
I show that states’ emphasis on work of TANF recipients, measured by the 
existence of the TANF job-search rule, has a statistically significant, independent effect 
on the percentage of state child care spending under TANF and the effect of having the 
job-search rule is conditioned by the percentage of female legislators in a state. More 
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specifically, while having the job-search rule exerts an independent effect of increasing 
the percentage of state TANF child care spending, the marginal effect of implementing 
the rule changes as the percentage of female state legislators increases. As a result, the 
marginal effect of the job-search rule remains positive up to the point where women 
legislators hold seats by 16%, but the effect becomes negative once there is more than 
28% female legislators in a state.   
These findings represent an important contribution to our understanding of an 
understudied aspect of TANF and provide directions to future studies. When states are 
freed to allocate and spend block grant funds under minimal federal guidelines, the way 
states design their policy can affect welfare recipients’ experience with TANF. In 
addition, state policy might not be tailored to advantage people who are most vulnerable, 
as suggested by insignificant effects of societal need factors on TANF child care 
spending. Therefore, this study emphasizes the important role of states under federalism 
and raises a question about devolution in providing welfare. Also, the analysis suggests 
that future state policy research should take into account the role of state specific policies 
in examining policy output, especially when a policy is financed through a lump-sum 
money. The results show that considering states’ policy intention which is presumably 
embedded in specific TANF policies helps understand state allocations of the TANF 
block grants, thereby emphasizing the importance of taking into account what rules or 
policies governments implement to push citizens in particular directions—which are 
highly likely to be in line with governments’ policy goals. At the same time, however, 
this study highlights that such state policies can result in opposite policy output 
depending on states’ political environments.  
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Although this study provides a possible explanation as to why there might be 
substitution between state TANF job-search rule and female state legislators on having an 
effect on state TANF child care provisions, further investigation is warranted to uncover 
why the interaction between these two factors brings about opposite results in terms of 
TANF child care spending when women make up a relatively high versus low proportion 
of state legislators. Lastly, future research that investigates how different TANF policy 
choices impact states’ prioritization of TANF block grant and what impacts they have on 
recipients’ well-being would broaden our understanding of TANF programs. Also, it 
could provide important implications for policy makers, especially when they deal with 
designing a policy with highly interrelated components in a single welfare program—




MAKING SENSE OF DIFFERENT WELFARE POLICY MEASURES:  
HOW AND WHY DO THEY MATTER? 
3.1   Introduction 
What explains variation in welfare policy across American states? Since V.O. 
Key’s (1949) seminal work, this question has been an essential part of the state welfare 
politics literature. Scholars have produced a tremendous amount of research while 
making theoretical and methodological refinements to earlier studies. Initially debating 
which one of two sets of factors—i.e., political vs. economic factors—is more important 
as determinants of state welfare policy, the literature has put much effort into finding new 
independent variables or interactions of two variables to better explain variation across 
states. Scholars also have questioned existing measures of political factors such as party 
control or inter-party competition (e.g., Holbrook & Van Dunk, 1993; Smith, 1997) and 
come up with new measures for these variables. 
Despite these advances, there has been little attention to the dependent variable; 
that is, how different scholars define and operationalize state welfare policy. Studies have 
used a variety of welfare policy measures to examine factors affecting welfare policy in 
states, such as welfare spending per capita, the recipient rate for welfare programs, and 
cash benefit levels. Each study has implicitly defined welfare in different ways by 
including different components in welfare spending measures. However, the literature as 
a whole has not discussed how studies define and measure welfare policy differently and 
whether that matters for the findings. Does the selection of indicators of welfare policy 
commitment make any difference for the findings in studies of the determinants of state 
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welfare policy? If so, what difference does it make? These questions get at the issue of 
whether we can generalize about welfare policy based on findings with respect to specific 
measures. These are the central questions I address in this paper.  
 To answer the above questions, I start by explaining how previous studies 
operationalized welfare policy in the American context and discuss how we might 
conceptualize welfare. Getting into an empirical section, I focus on welfare policy 
commitment and examine three state welfare commitment measures operationalized in 
different ways based on different conceptualization of welfare. The fixed effects 
estimation of 49 states covering the period after welfare reform shows that different 
factors are revealed to have influence on state welfare commitment as we use different 
measures of commitment. Emphasizing the importance involved in choosing a measure 
for a dependent variable, this study provides better grounding for future studies that 
examine related questions.  
3.2   Studies of State Welfare Policy: Different Measures and Inconsistent Findings 
As noted above, the aim of this study is to investigate consequences of using 
different welfare policy measures as a dependent variable. Therefore, in this section, I 
briefly show the kinds of state welfare policy measures scholars have examined in the 
literature and discuss whether they find consistent or inconsistent results in relation to 
key independent variables they examine depending on various dependent variable 
measures they use.   
By and large, state welfare policy determinant studies can be grouped roughly 
into two categories depending on what measures of state welfare policy a study employs 
as a dependent variable (see Figure 3.1). One group of studies focuses on welfare  
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Figure 3.1  Classification of state welfare policy determinant studies 
commitment, and the other group examines welfare generosity. Welfare commitment 
refers to the degree to which a state is willing to devote its financial resources to public 
welfare purposes, whereas welfare generosity indicates how well a state treats individuals 
or families who are recipients or potential recipients of welfare benefits. These two 
categories can be further distinguished within themselves in terms of what is included in 
welfare expenditure data and how they measure it. First, studies examining state welfare 
commitment use 1) state total welfare expenditures, 2) expenditures on multiple welfare 
programs, or 3) expenditures on a single welfare program.  Second, state welfare 
generosity studies examine 1) welfare benefit levels, 2) recipient rate or number of 
recipients, or 3) welfare program rules (e.g., program eligibility). Unlike the studies on 
welfare commitment, these studies do not use an aggregate measure of welfare generosity 
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across multiple welfare programs but focus on one particular welfare program at a time.15 
Some studies under these generosity categories examine one of these measures; others 
compare results from multiple generosity measures. In addition to these, a few studies 
address both welfare policy commitment and generosity in a single paper. 
The question that follows is whether these scholars obtain consistent findings 
across studies using different state welfare policy measures as to what factors are 
important in explaining state welfare policy. Earlier studies published in the 1960s and 
1970s focus on whether political or socio-economic factors better explain state welfare 
policy. They pay attention to political factors such as inter-party competition and party 
control and compare the effect of these to that of economic factors (Dawson & Robinson, 
1963; Fry & Winters, 1970; Hofferbert, 1969; Sharkansky & Hofferbert, 1969; Winters, 
1976). Overall, their findings are inconsistent; some show that socio-economic factors 
explain state welfare policy better than political factors (Dawson & Robinson, 1963; 
Hofferbert, 1966), while others find that political variables are more important than 
socio-economic variables (Fry & Winters, 1970). Also, some studies conclude that 
political and socio-economic variables are both important predictors of state welfare 
policy (Sharkansky & Hofferbert, 1969), which is the conclusion more recent studies also 
make (Hwang & Gray, 1991). As there exists a wide range of differences in the way each 
study is conducted (i.e., independent variables, time period examined, methodology), it is 
difficult to attribute these contradictory findings to any one aspect of study designs. 
However, it is apparent that dependent variables examined in these studies also vary in 
                                                 
15 An exception to this is Figlio, Kolpin, and Reid (1999), which combine Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC) benefit levels and Food Stamp payment levels, to test whether states compete over 
welfare benefits in a race to the bottom with their neighboring states.  
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terms of types of welfare policy measures (i.e., commitment vs. generosity), and 
components of the measures.  
Since the late 1970s, scholars have made efforts to refine theories of political 
influences, and they examined not only independent effects of political variables but also 
their conditional and mediating effects (Barrilleaux, Holbrook, & Langer, 2002; Brown, 
1995; Dye, 1984; Jennings, 1979; Ringquist, Hill, Leighley, & Hinton-Andersson, 1997). 
Given the wide range of differences in study design and measures of central political 
variables (i.e., inter-party competition and party control), these studies find fairly 
consistent results; political variables they examine have a conditional or a mediating 
effect on state welfare policy. However, again, since the dependent variables they use are 
so diverse, conducting an analysis using exactly the same research design but differing 
only in state welfare policy measures might lead to a different conclusion with regard to 
the impact of these political variables.  
In addition to inter-party competition and partisan control of government, many 
scholars have examined citizen ideology as another factor influencing welfare policy, but 
it has been employed as a control variable rather than a main independent variable of 
interest in a majority of studies (Berry, Fording, & Hanson, 2003; Krueger & Mueller, 
2001; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012). Findings from these studies are mixed; they find 
null effect or show evidence for partial support. However, whether scholars use welfare 
commitment measures or generosity measures does not make a discernible difference in 
these findings. Interestingly, among studies that examined state welfare expenditures per 
capita as a dependent variable, no study finds a significant independent effect of citizen 
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ideology regardless of the type of citizen ideology measure employed (Krueger & 
Mueller, 2001; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012; Pacheco, 2013). 
Also, scholars have examined racial factors since Wright’s (1977) work on the 
role of race in state welfare policy making. A group of scholars examine a backlash effect 
of race, especially that of African-American population, and explore under what 
condition the effect is mediated (Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003; Brown, 1995; Fellowes & 
Rowe, 2004; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012; Soss, Scharm, Vartania, & O’Briebn, 2001; 
Wright, 1977). Race is incorporated into studies using three different kinds of race 
variables: black population size, percentage black caseload, and racial bias in turnout. 
While a majority of studies find a backlash effect (Wright, 1977; Brown, 1995; Fellowes 
& Rowe, 2004), some show that the significance of a backlash effect depends on the state 
welfare policy measures examined (Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003; Matsubayashi & 
Rocha, 2012; Soss et al., 2001). Barrilleaux and Bernick (2003) shows that the direction 
of the effect of percentage African-American is opposite when it is tested against two 
different state welfare policies, one for the deserving poor and the other for the 
undeserving poor. Also, Matsubayashi and Rocha (2012) find inconsistent results for 
welfare commitment and generosity measures. Altogether, the previous findings suggest 
that empirical findings regarding the effect of race might differ depending on which 
welfare policy measure a researcher examines as a dependent variable. 
The review so far highlights that there are inconsistent findings with respect to the 
impact of various independent variables across studies. As I already mentioned, this may 
or may not be due to employing different measures as a dependent variable. However, a 
few scholars suggest that examining different measures of state welfare commitment and 
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generosity could make differences in their empirical findings with regard to the 
significance of a variable under investigation (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Cnudde & McCrone, 
1969; Howard, 1999; Jennings, 1979; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012). Therefore, it is 
worth testing the thesis empirically. An empirical test conducted in this paper only 
focuses on commitment measures of welfare policy. If results indeed change when one 
uses different dependent variable measures of state welfare policy to reflect differences in 
state welfare commitment, we have an opportunity to further examine how and why they 
differ across models. This can lead to refinements in theories of welfare policy. The 
following section describes how I construct different measures of state welfare policy 
commitment that are empirically tested in this paper.  
3.3   Conceptualizing Welfare Policy in the U.S. 
While many scholars have been eager to find explanations for variation in the 
level of welfare efforts and welfare spending across states (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Fry & 
Winters, 1970; Jennings, 1979; Plotnick & Winters, 1985), few studies provide 
explanations of what welfare means and how authors define the term at the outset. Some 
cross-national studies provide an operational definition of welfare or welfare state, but 
many apply the definition that comes from the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) or the International Labour Organization (ILO) without 
explaining the choice of that definition. This is the case in studies of the American states 
as well. Most state-level research refers to a classification of state government finance 
published by the Census Bureau and do not provide proper explanation of why the 
categories the Census Bureau consider to be welfare constitute welfare: Researchers use 
those categories as welfare because the government documents classify them as welfare 
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expenditures. Lack of discussion on this core concept becomes more problematic when 
scholars do not agree on the contents of the conception of welfare. For example, scholars 
interested in differences in welfare spending across the states might be looking at 
different welfare programs as a group, although these welfare programs as a group can be 
different in meaningful ways. Without a consensus among scholars about the definition 
of welfare, empirical studies conducted to explain allegedly the same phenomenon are 
not investigating the same thing after all. Therefore, the absence of discussion of the core 
concept can be a serious flaw for the literature as a whole.  
Richard Titmuss, in his seminal essay on the Social Division of Welfare, seems to 
be one of the first scholars who opened the door for scholarly discussion on the concept 
of the welfare state. Titmuss (1958) believes that the welfare state provides guaranteed 
minimum standards of living through social services in response to changing needs of a 
society. According to him, those needs occur because individuals are situated in ‘states of 
dependency’ for a variety of reasons over the course of their lives (Titmuss, 1958, quote 
from the original author). He and his successors represent the European view of the 
welfare state, which emphasizes redistribution of income as one of the important 
objectives of the welfare state. Also, Titmuss’s tradition makes it clear that social 
services provided by the welfare state are considered rights that a citizen could claim 
(Atherton, 1989). Reviewing studies of the past twenty-five years after the term “the 
welfare state” was first used in 1941, Schottland (1967) comes to the conclusion that 
scholars of both the U.S. and Western Europe generally agree that the welfare state exerts 
power to effect a redistribution of income by intervening in the play of market and 
political forces. This interpretation, which seems to be heavily based on English historian 
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Asa Briggs’ (1961) definition of the welfare state (Schottland, 1967), further notes that 
promoting economic security through income maintenance programs has been the 
primary goal of welfare states.   
Briggs provides more precise criteria for identifying the welfare state by stating 
that the welfare state is “a state in which organized power is deliberately used (through 
politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces in at least 
three directions” (Briggs, 1961, p. 228).  These include guaranteeing a minimum income, 
protecting against income insecurity and vulnerability by helping people to deal with 
social risks, and providing all citizens with the best standards of limited social services. 
Meanwhile, for some, his definition is viewed as describing an ideal type of welfare state 
indicating what the welfare state should be (Goodin, 1982; Wedderburn, 1965). For 
example, Wedderburn (1965) points out that the third component—the best standards of 
service provision for all—of the welfare state in Briggs’ definition is not accepted widely, 
and people rather agree that the welfare state “modifies the play of market forces in order 
to ensure a minimum real income for all” to some degree (Wedderburn, 1965, p. 127-8). 
The influence of Briggs (1961) is also found in Esping-Andersen (1983, 1990), who is 
famously known for his typology of welfare regimes. In The Three Worlds of Welfare 
Capitalism (1990), Esping-Andersen does not provide a clear answer to what he stressed 
as an important, yet neglected question in the welfare state literature--that is, “when, 
indeed, is a state a welfare state?” (p. 18). Instead, he introduces a common textbook 
definition which states that the welfare state “involves state responsibility for securing 
some basic modicum of welfare for its citizens” (Esping-Andersen, 1990, p. 18-19). 
However, his emphasis on the concept of “de-commodification” in developing the 
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typology of the three welfare regimes tells us what he considers important in understanding 
the welfare state concept. According to Esping-Andersen, de-commodification is a 
“mainspring” of modern social policy (p. 35), which enables people “to maintain a 
livelihood without reliance on the market” (p. 22) through provision of social services as 
a matter of right. In fact, this idea of de-commodification is presented in his earlier work 
where he defines the welfare state. Esping-Andersen (1983) clearly stated that “the state 
is a welfare state when it guarantees a decent standard of living to all, as a citizen’s right” 
(p. 28), and guaranteeing basic economic security for all citizens is one of the most 
important principles of the welfare state. Similar to Titmuss (1958) and Briggs (1961), he 
views welfare benefits as a matter of right to all citizens. 
While these European scholars have stressed redistribution of income as an 
important objective of the welfare state more than American scholars (Atherton, 1989), 
what seems central in the discussion among American scholars, past and present, is that 
assuring economic security of people against social and economic risks is a central goal 
of the American welfare state. It must be reemphasized that I do not insist that 
redistribution is a totally neglected dimension of the American welfare state. Rather, I 
argue that the most important criterion by which we should judge what welfare is in the 
current American context is whether welfare programs attempt to ensure economic 
security and economic well-being of the people. The emergence and development of the 
welfare state in U.S. history show America has put more emphasis on protecting the 
people—mostly the weak—from economic insecurity stemming from unregulated market 
forces through welfare arrangements rather than alleviating inequality. Public assistance 
was first introduced in the form of public relief, and the U.S. made the first step into the 
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modern welfare state in the 1910s with the passage of mother’s pension laws to provide 
regular payments to needy widowed mothers (Skocpol, Abend-Wein, Howard, & 
Lehmann, 1993). Moreover, providing economic security is mentioned as a central goal 
of today’s American welfare state in recent scholarly works (Garfinkel & Smeeding, 
2010; Katz, 2010a; 2010b).  
Katz (2010a, 2010b) is one of the few American scholars who offer a systematic 
definition of welfare. He defines welfare and the welfare state as “a collection of 
programs designed to assure economic security to all citizens by guaranteeing the 
fundamental necessities of life: food, shelter, medical care, protection in childhood and 
old age” (Katz, 2010b, p. 510). To him, protecting people from risk is fundamental to the 
welfare state. Similar to Katz (2010a, 2010b), Garfinkel and Smeeding (2010) emphasize 
that the welfare state designs institutions that reduce economic insecurity that stems from 
capitalism. Based on this discussion, I cast a broader net to define welfare, which is more 
comprehensive than that to which the public and politicians usually refer. While a 
minimalist definition of welfare includes only those programs targeted at the poor and 
often used in a pejorative sense, I define the American welfare state as a set of 
government programs that ensure economic security of people. “Is Program X designed 
to protect people from economic insecurity?” This is the very first question we can ask in 
sorting out welfare programs from other governmental programs.   
3.4   Hypothesis 
Paying attention to dependent variables and their measures is important as how 
studies define a core concept and operationalize measures of a dependent variable show 
what focal phenomenon scholars would like to explain and understand, not to mention 
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whether they are investigating the same phenomenon. From an empirical standpoint, lack 
of discussion of the conception of the dependent variable—in this case, state welfare 
commitment—becomes more problematic when we have inconsistent findings as to what 
explains variation in welfare commitment across states. As shown earlier, scholars define 
state welfare commitment in a variety of ways. Moreover, they report inconsistent 
findings across studies. Inconsistent findings on the effect of various key factors provide 
motivation to empirically test whether the choice of a dependent variable measure really 
matters. What might be the consequences of examining different welfare commitment 
measures with regard to finding determinants of state welfare policy?  
Presumably, using different conceptualizations and measures of welfare 
commitment is likely to produce different results in terms of what factors matter and how 
because different measures reflect different phenomena and these phenomena would 
result from different dynamics among various political, socio-economic, and 
demographic factors. In this study, therefore, I test a general hypothesis as follows: 
       Hypothesis: The choice of a state welfare commitment measure as a dependent 
variable results in differences in empirical results as to what factors explain 
variation in welfare commitment across states.  
While keeping an eye on other factors, this study pays particular attention to 
political factors. Support for welfare in general has been viewed as an outcome of 
political struggles between different political parties and citizens that have different 
stakes in welfare. However, depending on how we define welfare commitment and which 
welfare commitment measure we examine, associated politics of state welfare policy 
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might not be identical. Details on a set of different measures of state welfare commitment 
are discussed in the following section. 
3.5   Methods  
3.5.1   Models 
I empirically test the hypothesis using three models including a different measure 
of state welfare commitment as a dependent variable. It is difficult to attribute 
contradictory findings from the literature to any one aspect of studies, due to a wide range 
of differences in research design, variables included, and time period covered. Therefore, 
the key to estimating the three models is to model them as having an identical set of 
independent variables. The specific form of these models is as follows:  
Ys,t = α0+ β1Xs,t-1 + ΣμsDs + ΣρtDt + εs,t , 
where Ys,t is a dependent variable, state welfare commitment variable for a given 
state s at a given year t. Xs,t-1 is a vector of political, economic, programmatic, and 
demographic factors of state s at year t-1. Ds  represents a state dummy variable, Dt 
indicates a year dummy variable, and ε s,t is a random error term. 
I estimate the above fixed effects regression model including state and year 
dummies three times with different dependent variables—i.e., a measure of state welfare 
commitment—and the same set of independent variables and obtain the Least Square 
Dummy Variable estimators. By including dummy variables for each state, I control for 
unobserved time-invariant characteristics within the states which may impact the 
independent and the dependent variables. The year dummies remove the impact of certain 
events that influence state welfare spending across the board in the states. I compare the 
estimators obtained from each of the three models to see whether the impact of various 
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factors on state welfare commitment changes as we examine different measures of 
welfare commitment. 
I originally set up the models as a dynamic panel model which contains a one-
year lag of the dependent variable as an independent variable with state and year fixed 
effects, and estimate them using the Arellano-Bond (1991) generalized method-of-
moments estimator. The Arellano-Bond estimator addresses the problem of 
autocorrelation between the lagged variable and the residuals by allowing lagged values 
of the dependent variable to be included in the model as an additional independent 
variable. However, the three dependent variables in each model are so highly correlated 
individually over time that the Arellano-Bond estimators fail the test of instrument 
variables being uncorrelated with error terms. Therefore, I estimate fixed effects 
regression models without lagged dependent variables. In the Appendix B, I discuss how 
and why the estimators do not work by showing the results of post-estimation diagnostic 
tests for the Arellano-Bond estimation. 
 The data cover all states except for Nebraska. Because Nebraska has a non-
partisan state legislature, the data on some political variables are not available for the 
state. The studied period is FY 1999 to FY 2010. I choose FY 1999 as the beginning year 
of the analysis because not all the provisions and amendments in PRWORA became 
immediately effective when the law was adopted in August, 1996. For example, the 
PRWORA required states to implement Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) by July 1, 1997, allowing about a year for states to plan and adjust their policies 
(Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 1996). 
Therefore, I deem more appropriate to assume that there was some delay in timing for the 
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welfare reform to have influence on state welfare policies. Since state welfare 
commitment data are fiscal year data, I use a one-year lag for all of the independent 
variables that use calendar year data. Policy decisions are usually made during earlier 
months of a calendar year, so it makes sense to match data in this way. It is not unlikely 
that Federal aid variables that use fiscal year data have a contemporaneous effect on state 
welfare commitment, but due to endogeneity concerns, I lag these variables by one year. I 
adjust all dollar terms using the state Consumer Price Index developed by Carrillo, Early, 
and Olsen (2014).  
3.5.2   Dependent Variables: State Welfare Commitment Measures  
State welfare commitment refers to the degree to which a state is willing to devote 
its financial resources for public welfare purposes, which is measured as the log of per 
capita state welfare expenditures.16 In this paper, I exploit three measures of state welfare 
commitment based on different conceptualizations of welfare to test whether choosing 
one measure over the others make any difference in the estimation results. First, I use the 
U.S. Census Bureau’s definition of welfare spending that determines the Census measure. 
While the Census Bureau does not provide a definition of welfare per se, we can infer it 
by looking at what categories of spending are reported under a relevant category in the 
Census’s State Government Finance database. Many previous studies refer to a 
classification of state government finance document published by the Census Bureau and 
analyze data that are reported under the ‘Public Welfare’ category in the Census database 
                                                 
16 Previous studies use either state welfare expenditures or state and local welfare expenditures as a 
dependent variable to examine determinants of state welfare commitment (e.g., Gilligan & Matsusaka, 
1995; Hill & Leighly, 1992; Jennings, 1979; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012; Pacheco, 2013). It seems that 
there is no consensus as to whether we should combine welfare expenditures spent by localities into a 
measure of state welfare commitment to examine determinants of state welfare commitment. In this paper, I 
use direct welfare expenditures from states only. 
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(U.S. Census, 2006).17 Under the Census classification, state welfare expenditures consist 
of expenditures associated with Supplemental Security Income (SSI), TANF, Medicaid, 
other cash assistance programs that give cash directly to individuals contingent upon their 
need, payments to private vendors providing welfare services including medical care, 
provision, construction, and maintenance of welfare institutions, and other welfare 
activities not classified elsewhere, such as children services (U.S. Census, 2006). By 
looking at what the Census database includes as public welfare, it is quite clear that what 
the Census Bureau categorizes as public welfare programs are those targeted at the poor 
and often used in a pejorative sense, although SSI and Medicaid may be viewed 
somewhat differently. Therefore, I first estimate Model 1 which employs a measure of 
state welfare expenditures as shown in the Census public welfare category (Census 
measure).  
 Second, I construct a more comprehensive measure of state welfare commitment 
based on a broader concept of welfare state (Comprehensive measure 1). As suggested 
earlier, I conceptualize the American welfare state as a set of government programs that 
ensure economic security of people. By definition, this conception of welfare 
incorporates various aspects of social policy, including Unemployment Insurance, 
Workers’ Compensation, and public education, which is more comprehensive than the 
Census Bureau’s implied definition of welfare. Therefore, to construct the second 
measure of state welfare commitment reflecting this broader concept, I cast a broader net 
to add a series of spending data to the Census welfare expenditure data. Most 
importantly, the Census database does not include expenditures on Unemployment 
                                                 
17 These studies include Hwang and Gray (1991), Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995), Krueger and Muller 
(2001), Matsubayashi and Rocha (2012), and Radcliff and Saiz (1995). 
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Insurance, Workers’ Compensation, and public education under the public welfare 
category. While Unemployment Insurance provides economic assistance to unemployed 
workers who lost their jobs through no fault of their own, such as layoffs or 
retrenchment, Workers’ Compensation provides wage replacement and medical benefits 
to employees injured while in their work. Not only are both programs part of the upper 
tier of the American welfare state (Howard 1999), but they also meet the comprehensive 
definition of welfare discussed above.   
Unlike these two welfare policies having been recognized as a part of the policy 
package of the welfare state, public education has largely been dismissed and viewed as 
different by many welfare state scholars (e.g., Wilensky, 1975). At the same time, 
however, some scholars such as Esping-Andersen (1990) acknowledge that education is 
one of the salient parts of the welfare state, and more and more studies have scrutinized 
public education in relation to other social policies (Hega & Hokenmaier, 2002; Iversen 
& Stephens, 2008; Nikolai, 2011). Also, there are scholars who explicitly state that public 
education should be seen as a part of American welfare state. Public education served as 
an Ersatz welfare state in the U.S. (Heidenheimer, 1981) and must be viewed as “a 
central component of the American notion of welfare,” according to Janowitz (1976, p. 
34-5). More recently, public education has been recognized as a part of the American 
welfare state by scholars who emphasize the provision of economic security as central in 
understanding the American welfare state (Garfinkel & Smeeding, 2010; Katz, 2010a; 
2010b). Education policy is different from other welfare policies in that provision of 
education indirectly reduces economic insecurity by helping people raise their capability 
to deal with economically difficult situations (Garfinkel & Smeeding, 2010); it provides 
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social protection through social investment. Also, public education is available to all 
citizens; there is no restriction as to who can benefit, unlike other welfare programs. 
Following this recent scholarship, thus, considering public education as a welfare program 
is appropriate. I separate out expenditures on these programs that are placed under 
different Census functional categories and combine them with the first measure—i.e., the 
Census measure— to create the second measure—i.e., Comprehensive measure 1—and 
estimate Model 2.   
Lastly, I use a state welfare commitment measure subtracting public education 
spending from the Comprehensive measure 1 in Model 3—i.e., Comprehensive measure 
2. Although I argue that public education can be considered a part of welfare, some might 
still be reluctant to combine public education with other traditional public assistance and 
social security in examining state welfare commitment. It is different from other welfare 
programs I list above in that education focuses on equality of opportunity rather than 
equality of condition (Castles, 1989, p. 431), and it is universally available to all who 
want to use it. Also, it is future-oriented in that it benefits people in their future by 
strengthening their ability to cope with economic difficulties that they will face in the 
future. Table 3.1 provides information on the measure of state welfare policy 
commitment used in each model.  
3.5.3   Independent Variables 
POLITICAL FACTORS.  Scholars have paid attention to political forces that 
might influence state commitment to welfare. Sparked by the V. O. Key’s (1949) seminal 
work on Southern politics, earlier studies in the literature question whether political or 
economic factors better explain variation in state welfare policy (Cnudde & McCrone, 
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1969; Dawson & Robinson, 1963; Fry & Winters, 1970; Hofferbert, 1966; Sharkansky & 
Hofferbert, 1969). These studies focus on inter-party competition, party control, and 
political variables as a group and compare the impact of those relative to that of socio-
economic variables. In the current study, I examine (1) Unified Democrat Control, (2) 
Unified Republican Control, (3) Inter-Party Competition, (4) Electoral Competition, (5) 
Government Liberalism, and (6) Citizen Liberalism as political factors in the baseline 
model. 
Table 3.1  Measures and Measurements of State Welfare Commitment in Three Models 
Model Measure Measurement 
Model 1 Census measure 
Log of per capita state total welfare expenditures, 
reported under a public welfare category in the 
Census database. They include state expenditures 
associated with Supplemental Security Income, 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 
Medicaid, other cash assistance programs that give 
cash directly to individuals contingent upon their 
need, payments to private vendors providing welfare 
services including medical care, provision, 
construction, and maintenance of welfare 
institutions, and other welfare activities not 
classified elsewhere such as children services. 
Model 2 Comprehensive measure 1 
Log of per capita state total welfare expenditures, 
reported under a public welfare category in the 
Census database plus state spending on 
Unemployment Insurance, Workers’ Compensation, 
and public education (elementary and secondary). 
Model 3 Comprehensive measure 2 
Log of per capita state total welfare expenditures, 
reported under a public welfare category in the 
Census database plus state spending on 
Unemployment Insurance and Workers’ 
Compensation. 
Note: Differences across measures compared to the Census measure are highlighted in italics. 
 (1) Unified Democrat Control.  This variable indicates whether all branches of a 
state government are controlled by Democrats. If Democrats control both state 
55 
 
legislatures and governorship, the variable takes a value of one, and otherwise zero. 
While previous studies find mixed results on the effect of Democratic control on state 
welfare commitment, there is evidence that Democrats are more likely to support welfare 
than Republicans (Hwang & Gray, 1991) and that unified Republican control leads to 
lower state spending on welfare (Gilligan & Matsusaka, 1995).  
 (2) Unified Republican Control.  This indicates whether both state legislatures and 
governorship are controlled by Republicans. If Republicans control all branches of a state 
government, the variable takes a value of one, and otherwise zero. Including a separate 
dummy variable for full Republican control makes it easier to interpret the results.  
 Scholars have employed different ways of measuring partisan control. For 
example, Matsubayashi and Rocha (2012) separate party control measures for 
governorship and legislatures. This way of measuring partisan control would be suitable 
if a researcher is more interested in the effect of governor and legislators separately. 
However, since both executive and legislative branches need to endorse a bill to realize a 
policy, it is more appropriate to combine both branches in a single measure if one would 
like to test whether either party controlling a state government matters. Meanwhile, other 
scholars examine legislative partisan composition (or party strength) from Smith (1997) 
instead of or together with partisan control, either using a number (Gilligan & Matsusaka, 
1995) or a percentage of seats held by Democrats in state legislatures (Barrilleaux et al., 
2002; Krueger & Muller, 2001). These studies ignore the power that governors might 
exert in policy processes. A party strength measure assumes linearity in changes, so even 
though these studies hypothetically take into account governors’ power by adding a 
governorship variable as an additional control, for example, an interpretation of it is less 
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relevant to what this study tries to explain than the categorical measure this study 
employs. Since there is empirical evidence that Democrats behave differently from 
Republicans as a group in supporting welfare (Gilligan & Matsusaka, 1995; Hwang & 
Gray, 1991), this study is interested in whether the difference is observed, if any, as a 
function of discrete change in party control when we apply different measures of welfare 
commitment. Whether Democrats or Republicans holding seats by one more percent or 
one more seat in the legislatures makes a difference in terms of welfare policy is of less 
interest in this study.  
 (3) Inter-Party Competition.  This variable measures the degree of party control 
of, and competition between two parties for control of, a state government (Hill, 2003). 
This study uses the “folded” Ranney (1976) index that utilizes the partisan composition 
of state legislatures, the vote share for the parties’ gubernatorial candidates, and the 
percentage of time that the parties held both the governorship and a majority in the state 
legislature. The index ranges from 0.5 to 1, 0.5 denoting one party dominance and 1 
indicating perfect competition between the two parties. Using this measure (unfolded 
version), Cnudde and McCrone (1969) shows that the effect of inter-party competition on 
change in spending of several welfare policies varies depending on what policy one 
examines, while Flavin (2015) does not find that inter-party competition is an important 
factor in explaining the share of state welfare spending in total state expenditures.  
Meanwhile, using a measure very similar to Ranney’s classification, Dye (1984) finds 
that competition within states does not ensure increases in state welfare expenditures 
under Democratic control. Utilizing only the data on the percentage of seats held by 
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Democrats, Preuhs (2007) shows that her measure of political competition does not 
explain different indicators of the welfare state.     
 (4) Electoral Competition.  This variable measures the degree of competitiveness 
of district-level state legislative elections. This study employs Holbrook and Van Dunk’s 
(1993) measure that uses information on vote for winners, the margin of victory, 
uncontested seats, and safe seats. Scholars have often used the Ranney index and 
Holbrook and Van Dunk’s measure interchangeably to measure inter-party competition 
partly because they highly and positively correlate to each other for some period of time 
in the past (Shufeldt & Flavin, 2012). However, the two measures are conceptually very 
different (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Hill, 2003; Shufeldt & Flavin, 2012) and do not have a 
positive correlation any more (Shufeldt & Flavin, 2012). While Ranney’s measure also 
uses election results (but only that of gubernatorial elections), it focuses more on the 
extent to which parties compete for control of state government. On the contrary, 
Holbrook and Van Dunk’s measure of electoral competition gives more weight to the 
extent to which the parties are competitive in individual state legislative elections. Using 
Holbrook and Van Dunk’s measure, Barrilleaux et al. (2002) finds that the effect of electoral 
competition depends on party control of the legislature, and Soss et al. (2001) shows that 
a state with more competitive elections is likely to have more generous TANF policy.   
 Interestingly, these two groups of studies using a different measure of party 
competition both are inspired by V. O. Key's central thesis regarding inter-party 
competition (Key, 1949), but use theoretically different concepts of party competition. I 
view that electoral competition is closer to what V. O. Key (1949) tries to say when he 
argues that inter-party competition leads policy to be more oriented to the “have-nots” in 
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society because competition serves as a mechanism that enables the have-nots to promote 
their preferences as parties compete for votes. However, as studies examining state 
welfare politics employ either the Ranney index or Holbrook and Van Dunk’s measure 
and empirical results are not consistent even within each group of studies, I test whether 
they both have impact on each of the dependent variables by including these two together 
in a single equation. Because these two measures of party competition are both 
theoretically and empirically different, including both in the same model does not cause a 
problem (Shufeldt & Flavin, 2012). 
 (5) Government Liberalism.  This variable indicates the relative liberalism of a 
state government, i.e., how close to the left state legislators and governors stand on the 
ideological continuum. For this measure, I use Berry, Fording, Ringquist, Hanson, and 
Klarner’s (2010) NOMINATE measure of state government ideology, which ranges from 
0 to 100, with larger numbers reflecting a more liberal government ideology. While the 
findings are mixed, there is empirical evidence that states with more liberal governments 
spend more money on welfare and have less restrictive benefit eligibility rules (Berry, 
Ringquist, Fording, & Hanson, 1998; Rom, 1999; Soss et al., 2001).        
 (6) Citizen Liberalism. This variable measures the relative liberalism of citizens in 
each state. The data for this variable comes from an updated version of Berry et al.’s 
(1998) study of the measure of citizen and government ideology in the American states, 
which covers the period 1960-2013. It ranges from 0 to 100, with larger numbers 
reflecting a more liberal citizen ideology. While some studies show no statistically 
significant effect of citizen liberalism on total state welfare commitment (Krueger & 
Muller, 2001; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012; Pacheco, 2013), others find that a state with 
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more liberal citizens tends to adopt more generous welfare policy (Barrilleaux & Bernick, 
2003; Ringquist et al., 1997; Reingold & Smith, 2012).    
 ECONOMIC FACTORS.  Economic factors are widely examined determinants of 
state welfare expenditure levels. Some earlier studies conclude that the effect of inter-
party competition is spurious and in fact economic forces are more important than 
political forces (Dawson & Robinson, 1963; Hofferbert, 1966). However, other studies 
have shown that economic factors are not substitutes but complements to political factors 
(Hwang & Gray, 1991; Sharkansky & Hofferbert, 1969). Therefore, this study examines 
(1) Income and (2) Unemployment as economic indicators. 
 (1) Income.  This variable indicates fiscal capacity of a state, measured as log of 
per capita state personal income. While previous studies show somewhat mixed findings, 
many studies find that states with greater fiscal capacity have higher state welfare 
spending. (Hill & Leighly, 1992; Hwang & Gray, 1991; Krueger & Muller, 2002; 
Radcliff & Saiz, 1995).  
 (2) Unemployment.  As a popular measure denoting an economic condition of a 
state, this variable is measured as the percentage of state labor force who are unemployed. 
Since this variable shows how well a state is doing economically, thereby indicating 
demands for welfare, it is expected that a higher unemployment rate leads to higher 
welfare spending in a state (Flavin, 2015).  
 PROGRAMMATIC FACTOR.  Third, this study includes a programmatic factor 
that is found to affect state welfare commitment, which is Federal Aid.   
 Federal Aid.  This variable is measured as log of per capita total federal aid 
transferred to a state. Some welfare programs such as Medicaid and Child Care 
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Development Block Grant Program require states to match federal funds. Therefore, there 
would be effects of matching federal grants, which will positively influence state total 
welfare commitment as the amount of federal aid increases (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; 
Gilligan & Matsusaka, 1995; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012).   
 DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS.  Lastly, this study estimates the effects of various 
demographic factors: (1) African-American, (2) Hispanic, (3) Poverty, and (4) Elderly. 
These variables account for demands for welfare and different attitudes toward welfare.       
 (1) African-American.  This variable measures the proportion of state population 
that is African-American. Many studies hypothesize that there is a backlash effect when 
black population constitutes a large proportion of the society and find evidence of racism 
as an explanation for state welfare policy choices, including welfare spending levels 
(Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003; Brown, 1995; Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Matsubayashi & 
Rocha, 2012; Soss et al., 2001; Wright, 1977).   
 (2) Hispanic.  Similar to the above variable, this variable indicates to what extent 
a state consists of the Hispanic population. It is measured as the percentage of state 
population that is Hispanic. Some studies find that a state with larger Hispanic 
populations is likely to spend less on welfare (Flavin, 2015; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 
2012). Together with African-American variable, this variable can show whether there is 
a racial effect on state welfare commitment. 
 (3) Poverty.  This variable shows the percentage of state population living below 
the federal poverty level. Welfare programs incur costs when there are a greater number 
of poor people as the poor are the main recipients of welfare benefits and services. 
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Reflecting demands for welfare, this variable is expected to have a positive relationship 
with state welfare commitment.   
 (4) Elderly.  This variable measures the percentage of state population who are 65 
years old and above. The proportion of the elderly is often studied in Medicaid or other 
health policies. However, given that senior citizens are politically more active in 
participating in elections and that they support more spending on welfare (Howard, 2007), 
the percentage of this population could have an impact on welfare spending of a state.      
 Table 3.2 below shows the descriptive statistics of variables used in the models. 
Details on the dependent and independent variable measures and sources of the data are 
summarized in Table B.2 in the Appendix B.  
Table 3.2  Descriptive Statistics of Variables for FY 1999-FY 2010  
Variable Unit Obs Mean S.D Min Max 
State Welfare Commitment 1 
(Model 1) Log, $ 588 7.03 0.31 5.76 7.80 
State Welfare Commitment 2  
(Model 2) Log, $ 588 7.21 0.34 6.02 8.17 
State Welfare Commitment 3  
(Model 3) Log, $ 588 7.18 0.31 6.00 8.00 
Unified Democrat Control 0/1 588 0.27 0.45 0 1 
Unified Republican Control 0/1 588 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Inter-Party Competition 0.5-1 588 0.88 0.09 0.64 1.00 
Electoral Competition 0-100 588 38.71 11.05 12.05 63.10 
Government Liberalism  0-100 588 47.83 13.70 17.56 73.62 
Citizen Liberalism  0-100 588 52.58 15.63 8.45 95.97 
Income  Log, $ 588 10.54 0.16 10.21 11.04 
Unemployment  % 588 5.06 1.61 2.3 13.7 
Federal Aid 1 (Model 1) Log, $ 588 6.61 0.34 5.63 7.46 
Federal Aid 2 (Model 2) Log, $ 588 6.91 0.29 6.02 7.65 
Federal Aid 3 (Model 3) Log, $ 588 6.63 0.33 5.72 7.47 
Elderly  % 588 12.65 1.80 5.27 18.03 
African-American  % 588 10.50 9.60 0.31 37.08 
Hispanic  % 588 8.88 9.39 0.54 46.03 
Poverty  % 588 11.91 3.14 4.5 23.1 
Note: The statistics are for 49 states excluding Nebraska. All independent variables are lagged by one year. 
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3.6   Results  
Table 3.3 gives the empirical results from the regression analysis using the panel 
data covering 49 states over FY 1999-FY 2010 with year and state fixed effects. Each 
model employs a different dependent variable measure, but the included independent 
variables are exactly the same across the three models. At first glance, it is apparent that 
the statistical significance and the magnitude of a few coefficients are not similar across 
the three models, especially when Model 1 with the conventional measure of state 
welfare commitment is compared with the other two models using the comprehensive 
measures. While Federal Aid is strongly associated with state welfare commitment across 
all three models (p<0.01), the results from Unified Democrat Control, Inter-Party 
Competition, Government Liberalism, Income, Unemployment, and Hispanic variables 
are different depending on the measure of welfare commitment employed. Among 
political variables, the effect of Unified Democrat Control becomes statistically different 
from zero (p<0.10) when I depart from using the narrowly defined measure of welfare 
commitment; it is significant in Model 2 and Model 3 but not in Model 1. Similarly, 
Government Liberalism is significant at the 1% significance level in Model 1 but only at 
the 10% level in the other two models, while Inter-Party Competition is significant at the 
5% level of significance in Model 2 but only at the 10% level in Model 1 and Model 3. 
Also, the difference between the magnitude of its coefficients seems to be relatively large 
across the models. The coefficients of Inter-Party Competition show that as inter-party 
competition in a state becomes more competitive by a 0.1 point, state welfare 
commitment increases by 1.9% in Model 1, 3% in Model 2, and 2.4% in Model 3. While 
none of the economic variables explain state welfare commitment when welfare is  
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Table 3.3  Determinants of State Welfare Commitment from Three Models with Different 
Dependent Variable Measures, FY 1999-FY 2010 
                                     Model  












Unified Democrat Control (0/1) 2.80 4.53* 4.40* (2.33) (2.32) (2.35) 





Inter-Party Competition (0.5-1) 18.6* 30.2** 23.7* (10.6) (13.1) (12.2) 
Electoral Competition (0-100) 0.13 -0.08 -0.02 (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) 
Government Liberalism (0-100) 0.21*** 0.20* 0.17* (0.07) (0.11) (0.10) 
Citizen Liberalism (0-100) 0.13 0.10 0.12 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Income (log, $) 0.57 0.68* 0.64 (0.41) (0.38) (0.39) 
Unemployment (%) -0.04 2.36** 2.60** (1.03) (1.05) (1.06) 
Federal Aid (log, $) 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.29*** (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) 
Elderly (%) 2.32 2.92 2.94 (3.47) (3.04) (2.95) 
African-American (%) 1.24 1.47 1.59 (3.37) (3.25) (2.91) 
Hispanic (%) 3.12* 4.19** 4.32** (1.71) (1.75) (1.73) 
Poverty (%) 0.43 0.50 0.46 (0.41) (0.42) (0.43) 
Constant -2.51 -3.89 -3.09 (4.11) (3.94) (4.01) 
Observations 588 588 588 
Number of states 49 49 49 
R-squared 0.92 0.94 0.93 
Note: Entries of coefficients are fixed effect estimates from a panel data model with state and year dummy 
variables. The dependent variable in each model is log of per capita state total welfare expenditures in each 
fiscal year. All independent variables are lagged by one year and tested against a two-sided alternative. 
Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10 
a. The coefficients and standard errors of all independent variables except for those using dollar as a unit 
are presented after multiplying each original regression output by 100 for ease of interpretation. 
b. Nebraska is excluded because it has a non-partisan state legislature. 
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narrowly defined, Income predicts welfare commitment in Model 2 (p<0.10), and 
Unemployment predicts welfare commitment in Model 2 and Model 3(p<0.05). Among 
demographic variables, Hispanic is associated with state welfare commitment no matter 
how it is measured, but its effect is detected at the 5% significant level in Model 2 and 
Model 3 (p<0.05) in comparison to the 10% significance level in Model 1. Overall, these 
findings suggest that the choice of dependent variable in the analysis could change the 
way we understand state welfare policy making. A study that employs the narrowest 
measure of state welfare commitment—i.e., Census Measure—would conclude that 
Unified Democrat Control, Income, and Unemployment do not have statistically 
significant influence on state welfare commitment, whereas one using the broadest 
measure—i.e., Comprehensive Measure 1—would find those variables to be important in 
explaining state welfare spending. Similarly, a researcher using the welfare commitment 
measure that is conventionally used would be more convinced that Government 
Liberalism is a good predictor of state commitment compared to one who uses a broader 
measure of welfare commitment.  
The results shown in Table 3.3 is the key that highlights the consequences of 
choosing one dependent variable measure over others. However, I investigate further to 
see to what extent the results across the three models are substantively different using the 
regression output reported in the table. This is particularly important for interpreting and 
grasping the meaning of coefficients of political variables since those variables are index 
variables which are not easy to interpret. Table 3.4 shows the predicted influence of 
independent variables on state welfare commitment in the three models. More 
specifically, I obtain predicted change in state welfare commitment when an independent 
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variable increases by one standard deviation (henceforth, s.d.) from the mean. Effects of 
independent variables are reported only for those whose coefficients are statistically 
different from zero at the 10% significance level or less at least in one of the three 
models. Since the dependent variables are entered as a logarithmic form in the models, I 
calculate the predicted change using levels of state welfare spending per capita.  
Table 3.4  Predicted Influence on State Welfare Commitment Across Models 
Predicted Change in Dependent Variable Brought About 
by Moving Independent Variable One Standard Deviation Above Mean 










($28 more per capita) 
1.99% more 




($18 more per capita) 
2.64% more 
($36 more per capita) 
2.07% more 
($27 more per capita) 
Government 
Liberalism 
2.84 % more 
($32 more per capita) 
2.76% more 
($37 more per capita) 
2.34% more 
($31 more per capita) 
Income n/a 11.30 % more ($153 more per capita) n/a 
Unemployment n/a 3.87% more ($52 more per capita) 
4.28% more 
($56 more per capita) 
Federal Aid 12.14% more ($137 more per capita) 
10.19% more 
($138 more per capita) 
17.95% more 
($236 more per capita) 
Hispanic 33.97% more ($383 more per capita) 
48.24% more 
($653 more per capita) 
50% more 
($658 more per capita) 
Note: Individual effects are only reported for variables whose coefficient is statistically significant at the 
10% significance level or less at least in one model. They represent the predicted change in the dependent 
variables, holding all other variables at their mean. In calculating the change, I undo log transformation of 
the predicted value of dependent variables so that interpretation of the predicted change can be made 
toward levels. n/a: Not applicable. 
The estimates show that the effect of moving independent variable by one s.d. 
above the mean is greatest when the Hispanic variable changes. Depending on the model, 
states where the proportion of Hispanic is one s.d. above the mean are predicted to spend 
34% to 50% more on welfare than the average states. Moving Federal Aid one s.d. from 
the mean exerts the second largest influence on the change in state welfare commitment, 
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predicted to increase state welfare commitment by 10.2% to 18% compared to the 
average states depending on the model examined. A state with Income one s.d. above the 
mean tends to spend 11.3% more on welfare than the average when the broadest measure 
of welfare commitment is considered, while an increase in Unemployment by one s.d. 
from the mean is related to 3.9% and 4.3% more welfare spending in Model 2 and Model 
3, respectively. Compared to these variables, one s.d. increase in political variables has 
weaker influence on the change in state welfare commitment. Increasing these variables 
by one s.d. from the mean leads to a raise in state welfare commitment by 1.6% to 2.8%. 
Despite relatively small impact of political variables on state welfare commitment, it is 
important to note that they have differential effects across models. Again, it is possible 
that one can reach to different conclusion as to what matters for state welfare 
commitment depending on the choice of welfare commitment indicators. 
 As a further examination, I conduct a test on the equality of coefficients across the 
models using seemingly unrelated regression (Zellner, 1962). The test results indicate 
whether the coefficients of each independent variable across the models are statistically 
different from each other. I test the equality jointly across the three models (i.e., F-test) 
and between two models paired differently (i.e., t-test). Table 3.5 shows the p-values 
resulting from the equality tests. Variables in bold indicate those that are shown as 
statistically significant at the 10% level or less in at least one of the three models in Table 
3.3. As shown in the second column of the table, the coefficients of five variables—i.e., 
Unified Democrat Control, Electoral Competition, Unemployment, Federal Aid, and 
Hispanic—are significantly different across the three models at different level of 
significance although Electoral Competition is not a statistically significant predictor in 
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all three models as reported in Table 3.3. The results shown in the last three columns 
suggest that the differences in the coefficients of these variables are mostly derived from 
the fact that the coefficients in Model 1 and Model 2 are different and those in Model 1 
and Model 3 are different. These variables exert significantly different influence on state 
welfare commitment when I compare Model 1 with Model 2 or Model 1 with Model 3 
(p<0.05 or p<0.01). Meanwhile, the effect of Inter-Party Competition is significantly 
different between Model 1 and Model 2 (p>0.10) although it is not different when all 
three models are jointly taken into account. 
Table 3.5  Equality of the Coefficients of Independent Variables Across Models 
                                    Equality 
Independent Variable M1=M2=M3 M1 = M2 M1 = M3 M2 = M3 
Unified Democrat Control 0.06 0.03** 0.02** 0.75 
Unified Republican Control 0.50 0.30 0.24 0.95 
Inter-Party Competition 0.13 0.08* 0.26 0.10* 
Electoral Competition 0.01** <0.01*** <0.01*** 0.50 
Government Liberalism 0.37 0.26 0.17 0.78 
Citizen Liberalism 0.52 0.40 0.67 0.29 
Income  0.65 0.47 0.37 0.83 
Unemployment  <0.0001*** <0.0001*** <0.0001*** 0.14 
Federal Aid  <0.0001*** 0.01*** <0.0001*** 0.03* 
Elderly 0.87 0.65 0.60 0.95 
African-American 0.28 0.97 0.51 0.14 
Hispanic  <0.01*** 0.01** <0.001*** 0.17 
Poverty  0.97 0.81 0.81 0.97 
Note: M1, M2, and M3 indicate each model that uses a different dependent variable measure. Model 1 
employs the Census measure of welfare commitment, and Model 2 uses Comprehensive measure 1 which 
adds to the Census measure state spending on Unemployment Insurance, Workers’ Compensation, and 
public education. The dependent variable measure used in Model 3 is Comprehensive measure 2 which is 
Comprehensive measure 1 net of commitment on public education. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10 
a. Independent variables in bold indicate those whose coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% 
significance level or less at least in one model. 
b. P-values are rounded to the second decimal.  
 
 
Comparing the results from Table 3.3, Table 3.4, and Table 3.5 reveals that we 
would have gained different understanding especially of the role four variables—i.e., 
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Unified Democrat Control, Unemployment, Federal Aid, and Hispanic— play in 
explaining state welfare commitment depending on the choice of policy output measures. 
They differ not only in terms of to what extent they are a statistically significant predictor 
but also in terms of the magnitude of their marginal effects. For example, a researcher 
who uses the Census measure will find that Unified Democrat Control does not predict 
the degree to which states commit to welfare, whereas one who uses the Comprehensive 
measure 2 will conclude that who controls a state government matters for state spending 
on welfare. Similarly, some who use the Census measure will find a relatively small 
effect of Hispanic compared to those who employ the Comprehensive measure 1.  
3.7   Discussion and Conclusion  
This study analyzes a series of a panel data model with state and year fixed effects 
to empirically test whether the choice of the indicators of state welfare commitment 
makes any difference for the findings in studies of state welfare policy determinants. This 
paper adds value to the literature in that it gives attention to the dependent variable—i.e., 
state welfare policy—and focuses on how different scholars define and operationalize it. 
While many scholars have examined state welfare policy producing diverse studies, the 
discussion of how we define and measure state welfare policy is surprisingly scarce. The 
natural corollary of this is that we do not know whether the selection of dependent 
variables matters for the findings in studies of state welfare policy. After assessing the 
literature as a whole as to whether studies have found consistent or inconsistent results on 
their key independent variables of interest, I hypothesized that there would be differences 
in coefficients of independent variables depending on which measure of state welfare 
commitment we investigate as a dependent variable. 
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The findings support the hypothesis. The empirical results show that the measures 
we use shape the kinds of results we get. Whether the coefficient of independent 
variables matters for state welfare commitment differs across the models using different 
measures of state welfare commitment as a dependent variable. What these findings 
imply is that studies of state welfare policy and politics appears to be examining the same 
phenomenon on the surface but they could be telling us about different parts of welfare 
policy, and not about welfare policy more generally. Inconsistency in the empirical 
results across the models also implies that the findings are not robust across different 
model specifications. Therefore, this study highlights that it is important to have better 
understanding of what we examine as a phenomenon and we need to be cautious about 
reporting the empirical results. 
Then, what might explain the differences in the findings across the models 
examined in this study? Regarding the influence of Unemployment, it is likely that the 
two broader measures of state welfare commitment capture an underlying phenomenon 
that the narrower measure does not pick up, thus producing the difference in the findings. 
Recall that the estimation results show that unemployment rate matters in two models 
where I use broader conceptions of welfare; however, it is not statistically significant and 
even negatively signed in the other model with the dependent variable reflecting the 
narrower definition of welfare. On the one hand, the inclusion of spending on 
Unemployment Insurance and Workers’ Compensation in the measures of state welfare 
commitment could make the change in unemployment rate possible to capture the 
variation in broader measures across states mainly because the two programs serve 
unemployed individuals. On the other hand, it is reasonable to think that the association 
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between unemployment rate and state welfare commitment in Model 2 and Model 3 has 
to do with unobserved dynamics that political power of unions brings into state welfare 
policy making.  
Similarly, Unified Democrat Control determines state welfare commitment in the 
two models using the broader measures, whereas it does not matter in the model with the 
narrowest measure. Moreover, its marginal effect is not close to identical across the 
models; the effect is shown to be larger in Model 2 and Model 3 compared to Model 1. 
Again, these results could be suggesting that there are underlying dynamics related to 
organized interests such as unions which are not adequately captured in these models but 
presumably closely related with the working of partisan control in determining state 
welfare commitment. Unions are better organized and politically active than welfare 
recipients, so it is easier for unions to mobilize political power to influence welfare 
policies at their stake. It could be that this relationship between unions and partisan 
control produces the results we see in Model 2 and Model 3. However, it seems that this 
underlying dynamic is not at work in states’ decision making when only narrowly defined 
welfare policies are considered.  
Lastly, the results indicate that the marginal effects of Hispanic are greater in 
Model 2 and Model 3 than in Model 1, and they are statistically different from one 
another across the three models. Also, contrary to findings from previous studies (Preuhs, 
2007; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012), the effect of Hispanic is positive, meaning that a 
state with a greater percentage of Hispanic population tends to show greater commitment 
to state welfare programs. In fact, the measure of Hispanic used in this study might not be 
good enough to capture a backlash effect on welfare spending, and rather reflects a 
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growing trend, and thus increasing demand for welfare, in Hispanic population in the 
U.S. during the time period examined. From 2000 to 2010, the number of Hispanic 
increased by 44.1%, which was the second fastest growing ethnic/racial group following 
Asian. The increase accounted for 55.6% of total population growth during that time 
(Pew Research Center, 2012). The percentage of Hispanic children under 18 increased 
from 17.2% to 23.2% during the same period (Federal Interagency Forum on Child and 
Family Statistics, 2017). In addition, statistics show that Hispanic workers suffer more 
injuries and illness at their work place than any other ethnic/racial group (U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics, various years). All these statistics suggest the possibility that state 
spending on public education and Workers’ Compensation are affected by the growth of 
Hispanic population, which is probably why I find a strong association between Hispanic 
and the two broader measures of state welfare commitment. 
This study opens up new questions that call for further empirical research. While 
previous studies have shown whether and why a particular factor matters, the findings in 
this paper motivate us to ask, for example, why a certain factor matters for a particular 
kind of welfare commitment measure but not others. I discuss possible scenarios as to 
why I have different results across the models, but future research can further delve into 
this question. Eventually, this study provides better grounding for future studies that 
examine the question of who gets what and the associated politics of state welfare policy. 
Thinking through what a dependent variable truly measures would help interpreting 






DESERVINGNESS AND STATE WELFARE POLITICS IN THE  
POST-WELFARE REFORM ERA  
4.1   Introduction 
Students of state welfare policy have long been interested in the underlying 
mechanisms that determine who gets what from governmental decisions, and in 
particular, associated politics of welfare policy has been at the center of their inquiry. 
Wide variation in welfare policy across states has provided a perfect setting to uncover 
and understand state welfare politics. Among other aspects, scholars have paid attention 
to the generosity of welfare policies—that is, to what extent a state is generous in 
providing welfare benefits to individuals or families who are recipients or potential 
recipients of welfare benefits (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Jennings, 1979; Preuhs, 2006; 
Reingold & Smith, 2012; Ringquist, Hill, Leighley, & Hinton-Andersson, 1997). 
Compared to the pre-welfare reform period, the 1996 welfare reform sparked greater 
scholarly attention, making it a watershed moment in the history of American welfare 
states. While this historical event leads to a number of scholarly work in the post-welfare 
reform era, a majority of studies focus on examining the generosity of cash benefit levels, 
eligibility rules, or strictness of sanctions (Avery & Peffley, 2005; Fellowes & Rowe, 
2004; Filindra, 2002; Reingold & Smith, 2012; Soss, Schram, Vartanian, & O’Brien, 2001).  
 The limited scope of scrutiny in the literature limits our understanding of state 
welfare politics in the period after the reform. Has the politics of welfare generosity in the 
American states changed since the welfare reform of 1996? In particular, does the effect 
of party politics differ across welfare policies? This paper aims to answer this question 
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and updates the previous scholarship on state welfare politics regarding generosity. I pay 
particular attention to the notion of deservingness of target populations, and examine 
three welfare policies for different target populations to explore the nuance of welfare 
politics associated with generosity. Findings from earlier studies, albeit only a few, 
suggest that politics might differ across welfare policies serving different target 
populations (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003). Stereotyping welfare 
recipients as deserving or undeserving poor can be traced back to the 18th century (Katz, 
1989; Patterson, 1994). However, the welfare reform which changed the landscape of 
welfare in the American states might also have affected the way the public view welfare 
policies and recipients of welfare as well.  
 The examination of three welfare policies reveals that party politics still remains 
as an important factor in explaining state welfare generosity. However, its significant 
effect is more pronounced in welfare policy for the undeserving poor, and the direction of 
effect is not always consistent with what previous studies find. Overall, this study 
suggests that the deservingness of target populations plays a role in the way in which 
politics produces welfare generosity across states. I conclude by discussing the direction 
future efforts might head to shed light on unexpected findings of this study and more 
generally state welfare politics in the post-welfare reform environment.  
4.2   Studies on Deservingness and State Welfare Politics  
The notion of deservingness of the poor has been around for a century in the 
history of the American welfare state (Katz, 1989). People more than often depict welfare 
recipients as the “deserving” or “undeserving” poor; the distinction among the poor 
frequently appears in media discourses and political rhetoric when commentators discuss 
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welfare policy issues. We observed in the debate over the welfare reform in 1996 that this 
distinction has grown sharper; as a way of reducing welfare dependency, welfare 
programs introduced work requirements as a condition to receive benefits. Many 
programs were redesigned to help individuals who work, characterizing those without 
jobs as undeserving of public assistance (Moffitt, 2015).  
The deservingness literature argues that the perceived deservingness of welfare 
recipients is a key driver of support for welfare policies; how people judge recipients in 
terms of deservingness of help influences public opinion and attitude of welfare programs 
and benefits (Appelbaum, 2001; Petersen, 2012; van Oorschot, 2000). Although a 
majority of these studies investigate European countries, scholars find that the 
perceptions of welfare recipients affecting people’s willingness to support welfare is 
universal across different countries (Petersen, 2012; Petersen, Sznycer, Cosmides, & 
Tooby, 2012; van Oorschot, 2000).  
An extensive literature in political psychology examines what criteria people use 
to distinguish those who deserve welfare benefits from those who do not. Studies 
demonstrate that people make this distinction by looking at whether individuals are 
responsible for their deprivation and whether they make efforts to alleviate the need to 
get help from welfare (Cavaillé, 2015; Gilens, 1999; Petersen, 2012; Petersen et al., 2012; 
Thomann & Rapp, 2018; van Oorschot, 2000; van Oorshot, 2006). The “deserving” poor 
are people who do not intend to be in a needy situation but they are affected by factors 
beyond their control. They are perceived as individuals who cannot work even if they 
wish to, and thus they are not expected to work and are considered as deserving of help. 
On the contrary, the “undeserving” poor are those who are perceived to be responsible for 
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their neediness. They are perceived as making a choice not to work and prefer to live off 
public assistance because they are lazy. In this regard, the elderly, the sick, people with 
severe disability, and children deserve welfare, whereas people who do not work 
although they are capable of working do not. As such, findings from deservingness 
studies imply that the politics of welfare policy would be different depending on how the 
public judges the deservingness of welfare recipients. Policymakers do care about public 
opinion, and there is robust evidence that public opinion influence policymakers and 
policy making (Burstein, 2003; 2010). 
Meanwhile, the social construction theory provides a stronger rationale as to why 
we would expect the politics of welfare to be different across welfare policies that serve 
different target populations. In fact, it directs our attention to look at the link between the 
deservingness of target populations and policy design, and thus provides a theoretical 
grounding to believe that policymakers may treat policies for the deserving poor 
differently from those for the undeserving poor. According to Schneider and Ingram 
(1993), the reason why some groups are advantaged from public policies more than 
others can be explained by the social construction of a target population and the power of 
that group. Social construction is a stereotype of a group of people that is built through 
ideology, culture, politics, and history, which is closely linked with whether a group is 
viewed as deserving or undeserving of help. Schneider and Ingram (1993) argue that a 
target population would get either symbolic or substantial benefits/burdens from policies 
depending on how it is viewed from public and politicians in terms of social construction 
and whether that population possesses political power. Target populations can be 
categorized into four groups—i.e., Advantaged, Contenders, Dependents, and Deviants—
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by looking at whether they have positive or negative social construction—i.e., deserved 
by the public—or whether they are politically powerful or not. Policymakers concerned 
with re-election respond to the social construction of target populations through policy 
design because they can gain political support from their electorates through “feed-
forward” effects. In addition, policymakers have incentives to reinforce or alter the social 
construction through policy design as they see it benefiting their electoral gains (Ingram, 
Schneider, & deLeon, 2007, p. 106-107).  
As such, research on deservingness and social construction suggests that welfare 
politics surrounding policies for the deserving and undeserving poor would be distinctive. 
However, only a few scholars have tested this proposition. Identifying general assistance 
(GA) as a policy for the undeserving poor and Supplemental Security Income-State 
Supplements (SSI-S) as a program for the deserving poor, Barrilleaux and Bernick (2003) 
show, most importantly, that electoral competition exerts statistically significant 
influence on welfare efforts of each program in an opposite direction. Greater electoral 
competition leads to an increase in SSI-S effort, while it results in a decrease in GA 
effort. They also find that generosity of SSI-S, defined as SSI-S benefits per SSI 
recipient, increases when a state has more liberal citizen ideology, a greater electoral 
competition, and a higher percentage of African-Americans. They were not able to 
examine GA generosity due to lack of reliable data. Although Bailey and Rom (2004) do 
not specifically discuss the deservingness of target populations, they examined several 
policies that presumably can be categorized into different categories in terms of 
recipients’ deservingness—such as Medicaid, SSI-S, and Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC)—and find that different factors explain policy outputs differently. 
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Their results show, for example, that greater Democratic strength leads to an increase in 
the cost and access of AFDC and Medicaid, while it is associated with a decrease in 
Medicaid generosity, operationalized as expenditure per recipient.  
These studies look at the period before the welfare reform in 1996 or the period 
covering a few years after 1996. Therefore, we do not know whether their findings hold 
in the post-reform era. It is possible that emphasis on work, especially in Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) programs, might influence the way the public and 
policymakers view the policy and its target population and change welfare politics. 
However, we do not know until we test it empirically. In the following section, I discuss 
the choice of three welfare policies examined in this study and provide policy 
backgrounds and states’ role in each policy.    
4.3   State Discretion over Welfare Policies 
While we do not have survey or study results that identify recipients of which 
specific welfare policies the American public perceives as deserving versus undeserving, 
both studies on deservingness and social construction of target populations provide a 
guidance in choosing which state welfare policies to examine. Studies find that the public 
views the elderly, the sick, people with disabilities, and children as deserving of public 
assistance, while viewing unemployed people as undeserving (Larsen, 2006; van 
Oorschot, 2000; 2006). Based on this finding, I choose Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF), Supplemental Security Income-State Supplements (SSI-S), and 
Medicaid for comparison. While these are state-federal funded programs, state 
governments play a key role in providing benefits and services through each program. 
State governments exert discretion over important aspects of the program; for TANF and 
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Medicaid, state governments are free to design each program to tailor it to the needs and 
preferences of their citizen under general guidelines from the federal government. States 
use flexibility in setting the TANF benefit level, among other policy choices, whereas 
they decide which optional populations and medical services to cover under Medicaid. 
For SSI-S, state governments decide whether to provide additional monetary benefits on 
top of the federal SSI as well as the level of benefits they choose to provide.  
Note, however, that these programs are different in terms of target populations 
they serve. While TANF is often perceived as a program for the undeserving poor often 
depicted as ‘welfare queens’ who are morally deficient and as lazy people who are 
unwillingness to work (Bridges, 2017; Oorschot, 2006; Oorschot & Roosma, 2015), SSI-
S is a program that provides benefits to people who are over 65, blind, or have disabilities 
(including children) but need assistance due to no fault of their own, i.e., a group that is 
perceived as deserving poor (Bridges, 2017).  
As the most expensive state welfare program, Medicaid plays an important role in 
the U.S welfare system, covering 66 million people as of January 2019. While it is the 
largest program, Medicaid is relatively ambiguous to categorize in terms of the 
deservingness of the target population, partly because the target population is diverse. In 
its inception, Medicaid was viewed as a program for the deserving poor since it was 
initially started as medical support for recipients of cash welfare through vendor 
payments in 1950 (Moore & Smith, 2005; Thompson, 2012). However, ten years later, 
medical benefits were extended to cover people over 65 who would otherwise be unable 
to pay medical costs. In 1965, when Medicaid program was signed into law, the 
legislation mandated that states provide medical assistance also to people with disabilities 
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and low-income families with children if they participate in the program. Over the last 25 
years, the program has evolved to cover more people, including children and pregnant 
women in low-income families (Moore & Smith, 2005; Kronebusch, 2001). Therefore, 
comparing Medicaid together with the other two welfare programs would be useful to 
investigate the nuance of welfare politics in states. In the following, I discuss the ways in 
which state governments exert discretion over each program.  
4.3.1   TANF 
Jointly funded by the federal government and states, TANF programs provide 
cash assistance and support services to low-income families with children. As the product 
of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA), it replaced AFDC to “end welfare as we know it”. Many aspects mark stark 
differences from the predecessor, AFDC. For example, while AFDC recipients had 
access to cash welfare without a time limit, the bill set a time limit for TANF cash 
benefits. Also, the federal government required work and work-related activities to 
receive cash support. The most distinct difference, however, is that states have wide 
latitude in designing and implementing TANF programs. Within broad federal guidelines, 
states have discretion over the use of both federal TANF funds and state maintenance-of-
effort (MOE) funds and cater their own TANF programs to meet the needs of their 
citizen. As a result, states vary considerably in the way they spend TANF money and in 
the rules that govern cash assistant (Falk, 2011; 2016; Schott, Floyd, & Burnside, 2019). 
4.3.2   SSI-S 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) is a federal means-tested welfare program 
that provides nationwide cash benefits to the elderly, the blind, and people with disability 
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(including children). Enacted in 1972, it started paying benefits in 1974, replacing state 
funded and operated programs of assistance to the elderly, the blind, and those with 
disabilities. As a national program, its eligibility requirements and minimum benefit 
standards are set by the federal government. However, states can opt to provide 
additional income support on top of federal SSI payments, which is known as optional 
state supplements.18 States’ discretion over the optional supplemental program is three-
fold. First, states make a decision on whether to offer this optional program. Second, 
states that choose to supplement the federal SSI payments decide who administers the 
supplemental payments. States may administer the programs themselves, request the 
Social Security Administration (SSA) to administer their programs, or jointly administer 
them with the SSA. Lastly, states that administer their own programs can make their own 
eligibility criteria and decide the amount of payments for the optional state supplements. 
Some states provide supplements for all who are eligible for SSI, and others selected 
certain categories of SSI recipients. Also, there are states that extend the supplements to 
those who are ineligible for SSI. However, if states choose to implement the 
supplemental programs as federally-administered program, they must follow the rules of 
SSA regarding eligibility criteria and payment amounts and pay a fee per each 
supplemental payment to SSA.19 As such, states can exercise discretion over state 
supplemental payments, which generates variation across states in SSI-S generosity. 
                                                 
18 In addition to optional state supplements, states have responsibility to provide mandatory state 
supplements to keep the 1973 income levels of beneficiaries of the former state adult assistance programs 
so that the beneficiaries do not lose benefits when they were converted to the SSI program in 1974. 
Currently, mandatory payments apply to few people mainly due to the death and the increase in federal 
benefit levels since its inception. SSA reports that there were roughly 1,900 recipients of mandatory 
supplements nationally in 2000 (SSA, 2001). 
19 A fee ranges from $7.60 to $8.77 per supplementary payment during the period examined in this study.  
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4.3.3   Medicaid 
Medicaid is by far the largest state welfare program; it provides primary and acute 
medical services and long-term care services to low-income individuals and families.20 It 
is a means-tested entitlement program jointly funded by the federal government and the 
states. The federal government matches state spending on Medicaid based on the Federal 
Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP). While it started, in 1965, as a health coverage 
only for those who receive cash assistance, the program incrementally expanded to benefit 
a broader population. Today, Medicaid covers not only low-income children and families 
but also the aged, people with disabilities, the blind, and pregnant women and infants.  
States have broad discretion to administer, design, and implement their own 
Medicaid programs. While the federal government mandates that all states must meet 
basic requirements such as providing certain types of services and covering certain 
groups of individuals, known as the mandatory eligibility groups, states have discretion to 
extend coverage beyond the federal mandatory eligibility groups, and they also can 
determine which optional medical services to cover. Due to this flexibility given to states, 
wide programmatic variation exists from state to state, leading to variation in Medicaid 
generosity.  
4.4   Hypotheses  
The scholarly discussion on the social construction of target populations and 
deservingness of the poor suggests that politics involved in generosity of state welfare 
                                                 
20 In FY 2018, the estimated combined federal and state Medicaid expenditures account for 29.7% of total 
state expenditures ($603,166 millions). State Medicaid is the second largest program area next to 




policy might differ across programs serving different target populations. Also, a couple of 
studies provide empirical evidence that the target populations matter for state welfare 
politics at least where the pre-reform era is concerned (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Barrilleaux 
& Bernick, 2003). Building on the existing scholarship on state welfare politics, this 
study tests hypotheses focusing on party politics. In particular, I examine the role of party 
competition and party control in welfare policymaking. These two together with 
government ideology are the most frequently examined political variables in the 
literature, but the findings are not consistent across studies.  
First, the degree of competition between two major parties is likely to influence 
generosity of welfare policies differently depending on which target population policies 
serve. In his analysis of Southern politics, V.O. Key (1949) argues that heightened 
competition between the parties leads to policy outputs that are more responsive to the 
needs of the disadvantaged. It is because parties facing increased competition or the risk 
of electoral defeat have an incentive to appeal to constituencies as politicians seek votes, 
whereas parties under a lower level of competition have little incentive to broaden their 
electoral coalitions and represent median voters (Key, 1949). The empirical evidence is 
somewhat mixed. While some studies find that electoral competition is not a good 
predictor of welfare generosity or effort (Preuhs, 2006; 2007), others demonstrate that the 
effect of electoral competition is conditioned by other factor to have positive relationship 
with state welfare spending (Barrilleaux, Holbrook, & Langer, 2002).  However, many 
studies find that a state with more competitive party system tends to have overall more 
liberal state policy (Barrilleaux, 1997), a higher cash benefits level (Hero & Preuhs, 
2007; Ringquist et al., 1997), greater welfare effort (Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003), and 
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less strict sanctioning rules under TANF programs (Soss et al., 2001). More relevant to 
this study is Barrilleaux & Bernick’s (2002) work which investigates the impact of 
electoral competition on SSI-S and General Assistance (GA) programs. Consistent with 
their expectation, they find that states with higher degree of electoral competition are 
likely to spend more on SSI-S—i.e., the program for the deserving poor—but less on 
GA—i.e., the program for the undeserving poor.   
Given that the TANF program is perceived as a policy for the undeserving poor, it 
is likely that heightened party competition lowers TANF generosity as politicians would 
put efforts to win election by producing a policy that is more representative of the 
preferences of state citizens over TANF, i.e., the preferences that are inferred by the 
perceived deservingness on TANF recipients. Also, TANF recipients possess relatively 
weak political power, and thus there is little incentive for politicians to appeal to them. 
On the contrary, heightened party competition is likely to lead to increased SSI-S 
generosity because SSI-S recipients are not only politically more active and powerful but 
also have positive images as a group deserving public assistance. Therefore, I expect that 
greater party competition will lead to more generous welfare policy for the deserving 
poor but less generous policy for the undeserving poor. For Medicaid, the expectation is 
not that straightforward, given that population benefiting from Medicaid contains a mix 
of recipients, some of whom are perceived deserving and others of whom are perceived 
undeserving. However, given that the 1996 welfare reform decoupled the link between 
Medicaid eligibility and cash assistance (i.e., TANF), the stigma attached to Medicaid 
and Medicaid recipients could have been weakened (Brecher & Rose, 2013). If this is the 
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case, the political dynamics under Medicaid decision-making would resemble closer to 
that of SSI-S rather than TANF.  
Hypothesis 1: Party competition will have opposite effects on state welfare 
generosity depending on the deservingness of target populations a policy serves. 
Specifically, as party competition becomes heightened, a state will have a less 
generous TANF policy but more generous SSI-S policy and Medicaid policy.  
While I expect that party competition exerts an independent effect on the 
generosity of a policy as stated in Hypothesis 1, the discussion above also suggests that 
the effects of competition ought to depend on the direction of citizens’ preferences. More 
liberal citizens tend to prefer more generous welfare policy. Therefore, I expect that the 
joint effects of party competition and citizen liberalism on welfare generosity will be 
positive regardless of the deservingness of a target population. As a results, it is also 
expected that as citizens become more liberal, the positive effects of party competition on 
the generosity of welfare policy for the deserving poor are likely to be reinforced; 
however, the negative effects of competition on the generosity of welfare policy for the 
undeserving poor would be weakened. 
Hypothesis 2: The effect of party competition will be conditioned by the relative 
liberalism of state citizens. Specifically, as citizens become more liberal, party 
competition will exert a stronger effect on the generosity of TANF, SSI-S, and 
Medicaid policy.   
Next, state discretion over each program allows partisan control of state 
government to influence generosity of a given program. Together with party competition, 
partisan control is one of the most frequently examined political variable in the literature. 
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The literature typically finds that greater presence of Democrats in or Democratic control 
over a state government is associated with more generous welfare policy; under 
Democratic control, states are likely to adopt less strict rules under TANF programs 
(Avery & Peffley, 2003; Fellowes & Rowes, 2004), provide more generous cash benefits 
(Hero & Preuhs, 2007; Preuhs, 2006; Ringquist et al., 1997), and exert greater welfare 
efforts (Gilligan & Matsusaka, 1995; Hwang & Gray, 1991). However, some studies find 
evidence that more Democrats in control does not necessarily affect welfare policies to 
benefit the disadvantaged more (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003; 
Fellowes & Rowe, 2004; Kousser, 2002). The findings from Bailey and Rom (2004) and 
Barrilleaux and Bernick (2003) suggest that the impact of partisan control might differ 
depending on which welfare policy we examine. Both studies examine multiple welfare 
policies which are presumably for different target populations with different perceived 
deservingness and show that the degree of Democratic strength influences welfare 
policies differently.   
Following the prevailing findings in the literature, however, I expect that states 
with unified Democratic control of both houses of the legislature and the executive will 
shape a welfare policy more favorable to the poor because, on average, Democratic 
parties are relatively more liberal than Republican parties. I do not expect that unified 
Democratic control will negatively affect welfare generosity for the undeserving poor—
i.e., TANF. Although TANF and SSI-S target different populations in terms of their 
deservingness of welfare benefits, the fact that both are welfare policies does not change. 
The perceived undeservingness of TANF recipients is less likely to nullify the tendency 
that Democrats produce relatively more liberal policies compared to Republicans. In the 
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same vein, the effect of unified Republican control is expected to work the same way; 
regardless of a welfare policy examined, unified Republican control will produce policy 
output less favorable to the poor. In short, the expected direction of the influence of 
unified Democrat control or that of unified Republic control on each of these policies 
should not differ across the policies. However, I expect that the presence of unified 
Democrat control decreases Medicaid generosity, if any, while unified Republic control 
of the state government increases Medicaid generosity. Note that the measure of 
Medicaid generosity is obtained by dividing state total Medicaid expenditures by 
Medicaid enrollees. Previous studies on Medicaid find that Republican control leads to a 
decrease in the number of enrollees due to less spending on Medicaid, which in turn 
results in more spending per enrollees (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Kronebusch, 1993). 
Therefore, the two hypotheses follow.  
Hypothesis 3-1: A state with unified Democratic control of the state government will 
have a more generous welfare policy than a state with full control by Republicans or 
split control; and the direction of effect will be the same for a welfare policy for the 
deserving and undeserving poor. However, unified Democratic control in a state will 
reduce Medicaid generosity.  
Hypothesis 3-2: A state with unified Republican control of the state government will 
have a less generous welfare policy than a state with full control by Democrats or 
split control; and the direction of effect will be the same for a welfare policy for the 
deserving and undeserving poor. However, unified Republican control in a state will 
increase Medicaid generosity.  
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4.5   Methods 
4.5.1   Welfare Generosity Models 
To find out whether the influence of various factors on state welfare generosity 
differs across the three programs, I estimate three models with similar independent 
variables. For all three models, I initially planned to use the Arellano-Bond (1991) 
estimation technique because I modeled welfare generosity as a dynamic process in 
which generosity changes incrementally over time. Since state and year fixed effects are 
included together with a lagged dependent variable, obtaining OLS or GLS estimators 
would results in inconsistent estimators due to autocorrelation between the lagged 
dependent variable and residuals. The Arellano-Bond generalized method-of-moments 
estimator deals with this problem by allowing lagged values of the dependent variable to 
be included in the model as an additional independent variable. However, TANF and 
Medicaid models failed the test of instrument variables being uncorrelated with error 
terms, indicating that the Arellano-Bond is not a valid method for examining TANF and 
Medicaid generosity. A further test of unit root in dependent variables of TANF and 
Medicaid generosity models shows that unit roots are present in the measure of Medicaid 
generosity while they are not in the measure of TANF generosity.21 Therefore, I use the 
fixed effects model for TANF and the first difference model for Medicaid. By 
differencing each variable in the Medicaid model, I can remove all unobserved time-
invariant characteristics within the states which may impact the independent and the 
dependent variables. The fixed effects estimator can work the same way with regard to 
                                                 
21 The unit root test of TANF generosity measure rejects the null hypothesis that all panels contain unit 
roots (p-value<0.0001), whereas that of Medicaid generosity measure fails to reject the null (p-value ranges 
from 0.30 to 0.76). 
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dealing with unobserved heterogeneity. However, the first difference estimator is more 
efficient than the fixed effects estimator if the error term in the original model—i.e., the 
model with variables before differencing—follows a random walk, in other words, if 
there is serial correlation in the error term, which is the case in Medicaid generosity. Both 
TANF and Medicaid models are estimated by OLS with standard error clustered at the 
state level. Meanwhile, I am able to use the Arellano-Bond estimation technique with 
state and year fixed effects for SSI-S program, as I initially planned. In the Appendix C, I 
discuss the results of post-estimation diagnostic tests for the Arellano-Bond estimation. 
For TANF and Medicaid generosity models, the data cover 49 states excluding 
Nebraska as it has a non-partisan state legislature. The SSI-S generosity model estimates 
47 states; it excludes Nebraska, Missouri, and North Dakota. Missouri and North Dakota 
are omitted as there is inconsistency in reporting their SSI-S payment data. Although I 
focus on the period after the welfare reform in 1996, due to the difference in availability 
of the data on dependent variables, the years covered by these models are not identical to 
each other; the TANF model provides estimates for the period from FY 1999 to FY 2010, 
the SSI-S model from FY 2002 to FY 2004, and the Medicaid model from FY 2002 to 
FY 2010.  
The specific form of each model is as follows: 
TANF Generosity: Ys,t = α0+ β1Xs,t-1 + µs + λt + εs,t , 
where Y is TANF generosity in state s at time t. Xs,t-1 is the vector of political, 
economic, programmatic, and demographic factors of state s at time t-1. µs is the 
unobserved time-invariant state effects, and λt is the fixed effects of year. εs,t is a random 
error term of state s at time t. 
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SSI-S Generosity: Ys,t = α0+ β1Xs,t-1 +β2Ys,t-1 + ΣρtDt + εs,t , 
where Ys,t is SSI-S generosity in state s at time t. Ys,t-1 denotes a lagged dependent 
variable. Xs,t-1 is a vector of political, economic, programmatic, and demographic factors 
of state s at time t-1. Dt indicates a year dummy variable. ε s,t is a random error term of 
state s at time t. 
Medicaid Generosity: ΔYs,t = α0+ β1ΔXs,t-1 + ΣρtDt + Δεs,t , 
where Δ denotes the change from t-1 to t. Therefore, ΔY is the change in Medicaid 
generosity from t-1 to t in state s. ΔXs,t-1 is the change in a vector of political, economic, 
programmatic, and demographic factors from t-2 to t-1 of state s. Dt indicates a year 
dummy variable, and Δεs,t is the change in a random error term from t-1 to t in state s. 
4.5.2   Dependent Variables 
For TANF and Medicaid program, I operationalize welfare generosity as per 
recipient state total expenditures for a given program. I use state expenditures funded by 
state own resources excluding federal share in total expenditures of each program. 
Therefore, state total TANF expenditures include state TANF spending through state 
MOE contribution in state TANF programs and state separate programs. Note that the 
TANF spending data I use is limited to spending under the “assistance” expenditure 
category only. It is because available TANF caseload data count only the individuals 
receiving TANF “assistance” and exclude recipients of “non-assistance”. Assistance 
expenditures include basic assistance (aka, cash assistance) and other benefits to 
unemployed families such as child care and transportation. Expenditures on non-
assistance includes work subsidies to employers, education/training, child care and 
transportation for employed families, and refundable tax credits such as state EITC. I 
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obtain the financial data from the Administration for Children and Families (ACF). 
Therefore, focusing on assistance is likely to reveal welfare politics for the undeserving 
poor more clearly as unemployed people on welfare will have less favorable social 
construction than people who are working but still need help. 
I calculate state Medicaid expenditures (including Children's Health Insurance 
Program) by multiplying combined state and federal Medicaid spending by the Federal 
Medical Assistance Percentage (FMAP). The data comes from the Medical Statistical 
Information System (MSIS) database. MSIS is a reporting system through which the 
Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) collects Medicaid data from states. 
CMS website provides publically available state summary tables that contains aggregated 
level statistics relating to Medicaid eligibles, beneficiaries, and payments for Medicaid 
services. 
To measure SSI-S generosity, however, I use per recipient annual average state 
total SSI-S benefit payments (both mandatory and optional supplements), which captures 
the dollar amount that each SSI-S recipients receives on average. Supplements 
administered by state and federal government are both taken into account. It would be 
ideal to examine a welfare generosity measure operationalized in the same way across the 
three programs, but SSI-S spending data are only available for benefit payments. Given 
that the main function of SSI-S program is to provide additional cash assistance to 
recipients, I assume that the results of using a SSI-S generosity measure that takes into 
account administrative costs of the program would not make discernible differences from 
what I present here. 
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4.5.3   Key Independent Variables 
My principle theoretical interest is in party politics regarding party competition 
and partisan control. First, I test the impact of party competitions through two different 
measures: Inter-Party Competition and Electoral Competition. For Inter-Party 
Competition, this study uses the “folded” Ranney (1976) index, which measures the 
degree of competition between two parties for control of a state government using the 
partisan composition of state legislatures, the vote share for the parties’ gubernatorial 
candidates, and the percentage of time that the parties held both the governorship and a 
majority in the state legislature (Hill, 2003; Shufeldt & Flavin, 2012). The “folded” 
Ranney (1976) index ranges from 0.5 to 1, 0.5 denoting one party dominance and 1 
indicating perfect competition between the two parties. For Electoral Competition, this 
study uses Holbrook and Van Dunk’s (1993) (HVD) measure that utilizes the data on 
district-level state legislative elections, more specifically on the information on vote won 
by winners in a district, the margin of victory, whether the seat is safe, and whether the 
election was contested (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Holbrook & Van Dunk, 1993). 
Compared to the Ranney index, Holbrook and Van Dunk (1993) provides a more direct 
measure of overall electoral competitiveness of individual state legislative elections, thus 
focusing on electoral dynamics. The measure ranges from 0 to 100, 100 indicating most 
competitive environment. 
Inspired by V. O. Key’s (1949) proposition on inter-party competition, scholars 
have tested inter-party competition and electoral competition interchangeably although 
both evaluate different concepts (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Hill, 2003; Shufeldt & Flavin, 
2012). Therefore, we do not know how the subtle difference in these measures plays out a 
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role in state welfare policymaking. Since the Ranney index and HVD measure do not 
highly correlated which other, I test the effect of both variables in a single model. 
Second, to test the effect of partisan control on welfare generosity, I include 
Unified Democratic Control and Unified Republican Control, indicating whether 
Democrats or Republicans control all branches of a state government. It takes a value of 
one when Democrats (or Republicans) control both state legislatures and governorship, 
and otherwise zero. The measures come from Klarner’s dataset on state partisan balance 
(Klarner, 2013b). Among many other partisan control variables in the dataset, I use the 
variables that take veto proof majorities and super-majority requirements for budget 
passage into account to code the party “truly” in control of state government (Klarner, 
2013b). Some previous studies use different measures of partisan control such as a 
separate measure for legislatures and governorship (Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012) or 
rather use Democratic strength in state legislatures measured as a number or a percentage 
of legislative seats held by Democrats (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Gilligan & Matsusaka, 
1995; Krueger & Muller, 2001). The interest in this study is to examine whether a full 
Democratic control or Republican control of the decision making bodies in the state 
government produces similar policy output in terms of generosity of welfare policies for 
different target populations. Therefore, I construct these variables to reflect control over 
both executive and legislative branches. Compared to divided government, unified 
Democratic control (unified Republican control) would make Democrats (Republicans) 
easier to realize a policy that is relatively closer to their ideological orientation. 
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4.5.4   Controls 
Beyond party politics variables, I add other relevant political, economic, 
programmatic, and demographic variables to the models. These variables are included in 
all three models, if I do not mention otherwise. The political variables include 
government liberalism and citizen liberalism. Government Liberalism:  It measures the 
relative liberalism of a state government, i.e., how close to the left state elected officials 
stand on the ideological continuum. For this measure, I use Berry, Fording, Ringquist, 
Hanson, and Klarner’s (2010) NOMINATE measure of state government ideology (0 to 
100), with larger numbers indicating a more liberal government ideology. While the 
findings are mixed, there is empirical evidence that states with more liberal government 
ideology are more generous in terms of welfare spending level (Hill & Leighley, 1992) 
and adopt less strict TANF rules (Avery & Peffley, 2003; Fellowes & Rowes, 2004; Soss 
et al., 2001). Citizen Liberalism: This variable measures the relative liberalism of citizens 
in each state. The data for this variable comes from an updated version of Berry et al.’s 
(1998) study on the measure of citizen and government ideology in the American states 
(0-100), with larger numbers reflecting a more liberal citizen ideology. Studies generally 
find that a state with more liberal citizens tends to adopt more generous welfare policy 
(Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003; Fellowes & Rowes, 2004; Ringquist et al., 1997; Reingold 
& Smith, 2012). 
Economic factors include income, wage, and unemployment rate. Income: This 
variable indicates fiscal capacity of a state, measured as log of per capita state personal 
income. States with greater fiscal capacity have a tendency to spend more on welfare 
programs (Hill & Leighly, 1992; Krueger & Muller, 2002; Gilligan & Matsusaka, 1995; 
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Kousser, 2002). Wage: This is operationalized as log of mean annual wage in a state. In 
response to a decrease in workers’ wage, policymakers might make welfare policy more 
generous, or alternatively, they might produce less generous welfare policy to avoid 
welfare dependency among the poor (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Berry, Rom, & Hanson, 
2003). Unemployment: This variable is measured as the percentage of state labor force 
who are unemployed. This variable shows how well a state is doing economically. Under 
stronger economy, policymakers might push people out of welfare and to the labor 
market by limiting the use of welfare programs (Avery & Peffley, 2003; Jennings, 1983; 
Soss et al., 2001), but it is also likely that they response with more generous welfare 
policy because states has greater capacity to do so (Bailey & Rom, 2004). 
I include two programmatic factors in each models. TANF Caseloads, SSI-S 
Recipients, and Medicaid Enrollees: These are measured as the percentage of state annual 
TANF caseloads in total female population aged 15-44, the percentage of state SSI-S 
recipients in state total population, and the percentage of state Medicaid enrollees in state 
total population. For these variables only, I include both a one-year lag and a two-year 
lag in the models to see whether there are delayed effects. Federal Share: This variable is 
measured as the percentage of federal contribution in total program expenditures. It is 
expected that additional federal dollars induce states and especially poorer state to put 
more financial resource on welfare programs and thereby increase welfare efforts or 
generosity although it is not always the case (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Barrilleaux et al., 
2002; Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012). 
Lastly, I have a few demographic factors. African-American and Hispanic: These 
two variables measure the proportion of state population that is African-American and 
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Hispanic, respectively. Previous studies find a backlash effect when the presence of these 
minority groups in total population is greater (Barrilleaux & Bernick, 2003; 
Matsubayashi & Rocha, 2012; Preuhs, 2007; Soss et al., 2001; Wright, 1977). Poverty: 
This is the percentage of state population living below the federal poverty level. States 
with a higher poverty rate might be more generous as policymakers react to the increased 
demand, but they could also make policy less generous in an effort to discourage welfare 
dependency (Fellowes & Rowes, 2004; Soss et al., 2001). Elderly: This indicates the 
percentage of people over 65 in the state population. This variable is included in SSI-S 
and Medicaid models. As senior citizens are politically more active, they are likely to 
influence the generosity of welfare policies from which they benefit. Disability: It 
measures the percentage of people with working disabilities in state population and is 
included in SSI-S and Medicaid models. Children: This is the percentage of people under 
18 in state population. It is included in the Medicaid model only. Single Mother 
Household and Non-Marital Birth: The former measures the percentage of households 
led by a single mother, and the latter indicates the percentage of births out-of-wedlock. 
They are only included in the TANF model to see whether state policymakers make 
welfare policy less generous as a means to punish growing immoral behavior (Soss et al., 
2001). 
Since the dependent variables use fiscal year data, I use a one-year lag for all 
independent variables. For TANF Caseloads, SSI-S Recipients and Medicaid Enrollees, 
however, each model has a two-year lag in addition to a one-year lag. Tweedie (1994) 
finds that an increase in the proportion of AFDC recipients in a state from two years prior 
lowers the change in AFDC benefit levels, suggesting that policymakers’ response might 
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not be immediate (Peterson & Rom, 1989). Based on this finding, I include a two-year 
lag of caseload variable in each model to take into account the possibility of delayed 
effects on welfare generosity. All dollar terms are adjusted to 2010 (TANF and Medicaid) 
or 2004 (SSI-S) constant U.S. dollars using the state Consumer Price Index developed by 
Carrillo, Early, and Olsen (2014). Table 4.1 through Table 4.3 presents the descriptive 
statistics of variables used in the models. Details on all dependent and independent 
variable measures and sources of the data are summarized in Table C.2 in the Appendix C. 
Table 4.1  Descriptive Statistics of Variables in TANF Generosity Model for FY 1999- 
FY 2010 
Variable Unit Obs Mean S.D Min Max 
TANF Generosity $ 588 94.51 143.16 -377.32 1,596.67 
L. Inter-Party Competition 0.5-1 588 0.88 0.09 0.64 1 
L. Electoral Competition 0-100 588 38.71 11.05 12.05 63.10 
L. Unified Democratic Control 0/1 588 0.27 0.45 0 1 
L. Unified Republican Control 0/1 588 0.26 0.44 0 1 
L. Government Liberalism  0-100 588 47.83 13.70 17.56 73.62 
L. Citizen Liberalism  0-100 588 52.58 15.63 8.45 95.97 
L. Unemployment  % 588 5.13 1.64 2.30 13.70 
L. Income Log, $ 588 -3.28 0.16 -3.61 -2.77 
L. Wage Log, $ 588 10.60 0.12 10.35 10.89 
L. TANF Caseloads % 588 36.54 18.70 3.05 114.92 
L2. TANF Caseloads % 588 39.58 20.91 3.05 134.36 
L. Federal Share % 588 63.54 11.66 4.38 171.06 
L. African-American % 588 10.50 9.60 0.31 37.08 
L. Hispanic % 588 8.88 9.39 0.54 46.03 
L. Single Mother Household % 588 5.27 0.99 2.95 8.67 
L. Non-Marital Birth % 588 35.42 6.60 16.70 55 
L. Poverty  % 588 11.91 3.14 4.50 23.10 
Note: The statistics are for 49 states excluding Nebraska. All independent variables are lagged by one year 




Table 4.2  Descriptive Statistics of Variables of SSI-S Generosity Model for FY 2002- 
FY 2004 
Variable Unit Obs Mean S.D Min Max 
SSI-S Generosity $ 141 1,712.50 1,925.24 0 11,616.02 
L. SSI-S Generosity $ 141 1,615.95 1,724.24 0 11,616.02 
L. Inter-Party Competition 0.5-1 141 0.88 0.09 0.64 1 
L. Electoral Competition 0-100 141 37.47 10.70 16.73 58.01 
L. Unified Democratic Control 0/1 141 0.23 0.42 0 1 
L. Unified Republican Control 0/1 141 0.25 0.43 0 1 
L. Government Liberalism 0-100 141 47.07 13.39 23.74 71.84 
L. Citizen Liberalism 0-100 141 49.71 15.46 8.45 95.97 
L. Income Log, $ 141 -3.30 0.16 -3.55 -2.85 
L. Wage Log, $ 141 10.61 0.12 10.40 10.87 
L. Unemployment % 141 5.20 1.06 3.10 8.10 
L. SSI-S Recipients % 141 0.80 1.02 0.00 3.30 
L2. SSI-S Recipients % 141 0.83 1.02 0.00 3.25 
L. Federal Share % 141 90.58 13.73 1.00 100 
L. African-American % 141 10.57 9.72 0.35 36.48 
L. Hispanic % 141 8.75 9.30 0.73 43.54 
L. Disability % 141 7.89 1.97 4.70 14.90 
L. Elderly % 141 12.43 1.84 5.90 17.32 
L. Poverty % 141 11.62 3.19 5.80 19.80 
Note: The statistics are for 47 states excluding Nebraska, Missouri, and North Dakota. All independent 
variables are lagged by one year except L2. SSI-S Recipients which is lagged by two years. 
Table 4.3  Descriptive Statistics of Variables of Medicaid Generosity Model for FY 2002-
FY 2010 
Variable Unit Obs Mean S.D Min Max 
Medicaid Generosity $ 441 2,334.41 947.84 778.41 5,039.19 
L. Inter-Party Competition 0.5-1 441 0.88 0.08 0.64 1.00 
L. Electoral Competition 0-100 441 38.46 11.38 12.05 63.10 
L. Unified Democratic Control 0/1 441 0.28 0.45 0 1 
L. Unified Republican Control 0/1 441 0.25 0.43 0 1 
L. Government Liberalism 0-100 441 48.35 13.68 17.56 73.62 
L. Citizen Liberalism 0-100 441 54.09 15.64 8.45 95.97 
L. Nursing Homes Per 100k 441 6.42 3.05 1.81 15.89 
L. Hospitals Per 100k 441 2.26 1.36 0.63 6.71 
L. Doctors Per 100k 441 254.48 62.25 156.37 479.50 
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Table 4.3  (continued)       
Variable Unit Obs Mean S.D Min Max 
L. Income Log, $ 441 -3.26 0.15 -3.55 -2.77 
L. Wage Log, $ 441 10.61 0.12 10.39 10.89 
L. Unemployment % 441 5.38 1.65 2.60 13.70 
L. Medicaid Enrollees % 441 17.41 5.04 7.33 35.13 
L2. Medicaid Enrollees % 441 16.89 4.99 6.84 35.13 
L. Federal Share % 441 60.28 8.33 50 77.08 
L. African-American % 441 10.53 9.59 0.35 37.08 
L. Hispanic % 441 9.32 9.53 0.73 46.03 
L. Disability % 441 8.13 2.05 4.50 16.20 
L. Elderly % 441 12.68 1.75 5.90 17.32 
L. Children % 441 24.69 1.79 20.88 31.83 
L. Poverty % 441 12.06 3.13 5.40 23.10 
Note: The statistics are for original variables, not differenced variables, covering 49 states excluding 
Nebraska. All independent variables are lagged by one year except L2. Medicaid Enrollees which is lagged 
by two years. 
4.6   Results 
4.6.1   Party Politics Variables 
Table 4.4 presents the coefficients for party politics variables across the three 
welfare programs. Overall, the results show that the importance of these variables varies 
across the programs. First, there is no significant independent effects from inter-party 
competition and electoral competition in all three generosity models, which fails to 
provide support for Hypothesis 1. However, the interaction term between inter-party 
competition and citizen ideology is statistically significant in an expected direction in the 
SSI-S model, and the interaction term between electoral competition and citizen ideology 
is statistically significant in an expected direction in the Medicaid model, while both are 
not significant predictors of TANF generosity. In the SSI-S model, the interaction 
between inter-party competition and citizen liberalism is positively signed and 
statistically significant (p<0.10). It indicates that citizen ideological preferences 
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conditions the impact of inter-party competition in a way that the impact on SSI-S 
generosity increases as citizens become more liberal. In the Medicaid model, the 
interaction between electoral competition and citizen liberalism is positively signed and 
statistically significant (p<0.05). It means that that the influence from electoral 
competition on Medicaid generosity is augmented as state citizens lean toward a more 
liberal side of the political spectrum. Therefore, the results provide partial support for 
Hypothesis 2.  
Table 4.4. Results for Party Politics Variables Across Three Welfare Policies 
Party Politics Variable TANF SSI-S Medicaid 
Inter-Party Competition * Citizen Liberalism 0.09 219.35* 16.42 
 (2.74) (129.44) (16.64) 
Electoral Competition * Citizen Liberalism 0.01 -1.84 0.23** 
 (0.03) (1.43) (0.11) 
Unified Democratic Control -29.78** 1,436.75** -12.02 
 (12.38) (514.00) (43.22) 
Unified Republican Control 20.4 -428.63 84.63* 
  (17.27) (396.77) (51.27) 
Inter-Party Competition -24.24 -8,785.18 -51.03 
 (165.43) (7,194.39) (1,034.80) 
Electoral Competition -2.63 41.81 -11.08 
 (1.81) (74.54) (7.75) 
Note: ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10 
Next, unified Democratic control is statistically significant in TANF and SSI-S 
models, but it exerts influence in an opposite direction in the two models (p<0.05). A 
state with full Democratic control is likely to be less generous in TANF program but 
more generous in SSI-S program than a state with different partisan composition of a 
state government, taking everything else into account. These results fail to provide 
support for Hypothesis 3-1 which posits that Democrats’ full control over the state 
government will lead to more generous welfare policy regardless of the deservingness of 
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target populations. Meanwhile, unified Republican control is statistically significant and 
positive only in the Medicaid model, meaning that states tend to have more generous 
Medicaid policy under the full Republican control. This is consistent with Hypothesis 3-2 
with regard to Medicaid generosity. Overall, the results provide partial support for 
Hypothesis 3-1 and 3-2.  
4.6.2   Other Variables 
Table 4.5 through Table 4.7 reports the estimates for all independent variables 
from TANF, SSI-S, and Medicaid generosity models. A few other variables explain the 
generosity of TANF programs. First, government liberalism exerts a positive impact on 
TANF generosity (p<0.10); state governments with a more liberal ideology have more 
generous TANF programs than state governments with a more conservative ideology. 
Also, the percentage of TANF caseloads from the previous year has statistically 
significant and negative effect (p<0.10), while that from two years prior has statistically 
significant and positive effect on TANF generosity (p<0.05). Concerned with welfare 
dependency, policymakers might make TANF policy less generous as TANF caseloads 
from the previous year increases. The positive effect of TANF caseloads from two years 
prior seems puzzling, and further investigation is needed for better understanding of the 
phenomenon. Federal share is a statistically significant, positive predictor of state’s 
TANF generosity (p<0.10). A greater percentage of federal money in TANF total 
expenditures induces states to become more generous. Among demographic variables, 
single mother household has statistically significant and negative impact on TANF 
generosity (p<0.05). A state with a higher percentage of single mother headed household 
tends to be less generous in TANF programs, which is consistent with a social 
101 
 
construction interpretation. Negatively constructed images of single mothers seems to 
affect policymaking to result in TANF policy unfavorable to the TANF recipients. 
Meanwhile, the coefficient of African-American is statistically significant and negative, 
indicating that there is a backlash effect (p<0.10).   
 In the SSI-S model, unemployment rate is a statistically significant and negative 
predictor of SSI-S generosity (p<0.10). Rather than increasing generosity of SSI-S policy 
by providing a greater supplemental benefit per recipient under stronger economy, states 
seem to become less generous pushing people to find ways to support themselves in the 
market. For Medicaid, the rate of nursing homes exerts statistically significant and 
negative influence on the generosity of Medicaid (p<0.01). Also, the percentage of 
Medicaid enrollees from the previous year exerts significant, positive influence on 
Medicaid generosity (p<0.01). Unlike in the case of TANF policymaking where the 
generosity of the program decreases as the previous year’s TANF caseloads increases, 





Table 4.5  Determinants of State TANF Generosity, FY 1999-FY 2010  
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Inter-Party Competition * Citizen Liberalism  0.09 2.74 
Electoral Competition * Citizen Liberalism 0.01 0.03 
Unified Democratic Control (0/1) -29.78** 12.38 
Unified Republican Control (0/1) 20.40 17.27 
Inter-Party Competition (0.5-1) -24.24 165.43 
Electoral Competition (0-100) -2.63 1.81 
Government Liberalism (0-100) 0.87* 0.49 
Citizen Liberalism (0-100) -0.01 2.79 
Income (log, $) 140.09 129.40 
Wage (log, $) 639.11 477.09 
Unemployment (%) -0.01 6.34 
TANF Caseloads (%) -1.95* 1.11 
TANF Caseloadst-2 (%) 2.29** 1.15 
Federal Share (%) 5.59* 3.02 
African-American (%) -29.17* 17.65 
Hispanic (%) 2.69 6.00 
Single Mother Household (%) -10.40** 5.29 
Non-Marital Birth (%) -1.39 3.09 
Poverty (%) -0.15 1.95 
Constant -6,077.15 5,110.96 
Observations 588  
Number of Statesa 49  
Number of Years 12  
Note: Presented are estimates from the fixed effects model with state and year fixed effects using clustered 
standard errors. All independent variables are lagged by one year except the second TANF Caseloads 
which is lagged by two years as denoted by a subscript t-2. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10 




Table 4.6  Determinants of State SSI-S Generosity, FY 2002-FY 2004 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Lagged Dependent Variable ($) 0.42 0.38 
Inter-Party Competition * Citizen Liberalism 219.35* 129.44 
Electoral Competition * Citizen Liberalism -1.84 1.43 
Unified Democratic Control (0/1) 1,436.75*** 514.00 
Unified Republican Control (0/1) -428.63 396.77 
Inter-Party Competition (0.5-1) -8,785.18 7,194.39 
Electoral Competition (0-100) 41.81 74.54 
Government Liberalism (0-100) 0.43 14.96 
Citizen Liberalism (0-100) -98.23 123.91 
Income (log, $) -7,021.07 6,421.83 
Wage (log, $) 5,022.57 9,622.83 
Unemployment (%) -444.45* 239.91 
SSI-S Recipients (%) -1,138.77 815.89 
SSI-S Recipientst-2 (%) 763.09 1,187.64 
Federal Share (%) 5.95 12.11 
African-American (%) 1,161.56 1,011.65 
Hispanic (%) -19.15 422.66 
Disability (%) 85.70 89.51 
Elderly (%) -53.95 1,042.94 
Poverty (%) 53.81 76.20 
Constant -81,516.36 111,085.70 
Observations 141  
Number of Statesa 47  
Number of Years 3  
Arellano-Bond Test (order 1) 0.08  
Arellano-Bond Test (order 2) 0.43  
Sargan Test (p-value) 0.99  
Note: The table reports Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data estimates with the year fixed effects and the 
conventional gmm standard error. All independent variables are lagged by one year except the second SSI-S 
Recipients which is lagged by two years as denoted by a subscript t-2. The statistic from Arellano-Bond test 
(order 2) shows that there is no serial correlation in the residuals of order 2. The p-value of the Sargan test 
indicates that conditions for overidentifying restrictions are met. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10 
a. Nebraska is excluded because it has a non-partisan state legislature. Missouri and North Dakota are 






Table 4.7  Determinants of Medicaid Generosity, FY 2002-FY 2010 
Independent Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Inter-Party Competition * Citizen Liberalism 16.42 16.64 
Electoral Competition * Citizen Liberalism 0.23** 0.11 
Unified Democratic Control (0/1) -12.02 43.22 
Unified Republican Control (0/1) 84.63* 51.27 
Inter-Party Competition (0.5-1) -51.03 1,034.80 
Electoral Competition (0-100) -11.08 7.75 
Government Liberalism (0-100) 1.93 1.98 
Citizen Liberalism (0-100) -24.38 15.27 
Nursing Homes (per 100k) -198.56*** 73.22 
Hospitals (per 100k) 23.54 144.25 
Doctors (per 100k) -0.01 1.87 
Income (log, $) 281.24 628.99 
Wage (log, $) -751.86 1,358.44 
Unemployment (%) -21.78 20.37 
Medicaid Enrollees (%) 31.89*** 10.97 
Medicaid Enrolleest-2 (%) -4.39 5.60 
Federal Share (%) -6.34 9.74 
African-American (%) 50.80 50.16 
Hispanic (%) -18.21 56.25 
Disability (%) -5.22 10.36 
Elderly (%) -41.64 171.10 
Children (%) -6.55 118.75 
Poverty (%) -1.89 8.06 
Constant 100.43** 46.19 
Observations 441  
Number of Statesa 49  
Number of Years 9  
Note: Presented are estimates from the first difference model with year dummies using clustered standard 
errors. All independent variables are lagged by one year except the second Medicaid Enrollees which is 
lagged by two years as denoted by a subscript t-2. ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.10 
a. Nebraska is excluded because it has a non-partisan state legislature. 
4.7   Discussion and Conclusion 
In this study, I analyze three welfare policies serving different target populations 
to examine whether the nuance of state welfare politics differs across the policies. By 
examining state welfare generosity across three different programs after the 1996 welfare 
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reform, this study provides a valuable update and extension to the old debate regarding 
party politics and its relationship to welfare policymaking. On the one hand, the results 
from TANF, SSI-S, and Medicaid generosity models largely resonate the findings from 
earlier period in that they show party politics play an important role in explaining welfare 
generosity across states. This study finds that partisan control makes a difference for 
welfare generosity, but its effect for welfare policies targeting the deserving poor is 
opposite to its effect for policies targeting the undeserving poor. While I expect that 
unified Democratic control will have positive influence on both TANF and SSI-S 
generosity, it turns out that it has a positive effect on SSI-S generosity but a negative 
effect on TANF generosity. The finding on TANF generosity echoes that of Fellowes and 
Rowes (2004) and Barilleaux and Bernick (2003). Fellowes and Rowes (2004) find that a 
state with greater presence of Democrats in state legislatures tends to provide a lower 
level of TANF cash benefits, whereas Barilleaux and Bernick (2003) show that stronger 
presence of Democrats in a state’s lower house decreases per capita GA spending. While 
it is difficult to explain these unexpected findings of the earlier studies, it is probable that 
this study finds the negative effect of unified Democratic control because full Democratic 
control provides more access to TANF but the rate of spending increase does not outpace 
that of recipients for some reason. Note that this study uses the TANF generosity measure 
constructed from state TANF spending on assistance as oppose to total state TANF 
spending. If total state TANF spending is considered, the finding of this partisan control 
variable may or may not change. However, the reason behind this unexpected result must 
remain open, given that TANF caseload data are collected only for individuals receiving 
TANF assistance. Meanwhile, the significant and positive, albeit relatively weak, effect 
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of unified Republican control on Medicaid generosity is consistent with what previous 
studies suggest. It is likely that full Republican control leads to a decrease in the number 
of enrollees due to preference for less access to Medicaid, which in turn could results in 
more spending per enrollees (Bailey & Rom, 2004; Kronebusch, 1993). 
On the other hand, the findings of this study offer an important point of departure 
from the previous literature in thinking about how party competition is linked to welfare 
generosity. This study provides a theoretical refinement by showing that party 
competition plays a role only when it is interacted with citizen liberalism; there are a 
significant and positive joint effect of inter-party competition and citizen liberalism and 
that of electoral competition and citizen liberalism on welfare generosity, whereas inter-
party competition and electoral competition do not exert an independent influence. 
Interestingly, this study shows that a different measure of party competition has a 
significant conditioned impact on SSI-S and Medicaid, respectively; inter-party 
competition affects SSI-S generosity jointly with citizen liberalism, while electoral 
competition is important in explaining Medicaid generosity when it is interacted with 
citizen liberalism. Given that previous studies investigate these party competition 
variables only one at a time, it requires further examination to understand why different 
party competition measures affect different welfare policies. Meanwhile, the results show 
that TANF generosity is not susceptible to any party competition variables including the 
interaction terms, which is unexpected given the finding of Barrilleaux and Bernick 
(2003). One might conceive that the fact that work requirements became one of the 
signature attributes of TANF programs unlike the predecessor—i.e., AFDC—from the 
pre-welfare reform era might change the way policymakers and the public perceive the 
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deservingness of TANF recipients, and thus weaken the linkage between party 
competition and TANF generosity.  
Overall, the findings lead to the conclusion that party politics is an important 
factor explaining the generosity of state welfare policy, especially where welfare policy 
for the deserving poor and mixed population is concerned. Despite these findings, some 
cautionary notes should be sounded. First, different findings across the three generosity 
models might be resulting from employing a different estimation technique for each 
model. Although I follow the appropriate processes in choosing estimation methods, we 
cannot zero out the possibility that findings would change if the same estimation 
technique is applied to the three models. Second, limitations in TANF expenditure data 
suggests caution in interpreting the results of the TANF generosity model. Since states 
can make changes to previous TANF expenditure reports, there are occasions that 
reported spending does not correctly reflect actual spending of a given fiscal year. As a 
result, TANF expenditure data includes negative or zero values. In fact, the TANF 
generosity measure includes 11 negative values and 18 zero values due to this accounting 
practices, and treating these observations as missing yields slightly different results from 
what I discuss earlier. The fact that the TANF data I use in this study is the only source 
available across states suggests that there is a need for better data collecting practices. 
Third, using different time periods for the different programs might affect the empirical 
results, which creates concerns regarding comparability across the three programs. Due to 
data availability, this study uses a much shorter period of time in examining SSI-S 
generosity compared to the other two policies. It is reasonable to think that variability 
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would be less in a shorter period than in a longer period, so utilizing variability in a 
shorter period can reduce the chance of detecting significant results.  
Additional research is needed to investigate different dimensions of generosity 
across different welfare policies in the post-welfare reform era. Scholars have produced 
extensive research on state welfare politics since the passage of PRWORA, but the 
scholarship exclusively focuses on investigating eligibility generosity or sanctions 
(Fellowes & Rowes, 2004; Lukens, 2014; Soss et al., 2001) and interests in other 
dimensions of generosity seems to have faded away. However, as shown in earlier 
studies, broadening the scope of scrutiny to include different welfare policies and 
different measures can help us detect subtle but meaningful differences in welfare 
politics, which eventually enriches our understanding of who gets what and why in the 
post-welfare reform era. Another path that future studies can take is to reconsider 
traditional views on the working of various political factors and make an effort to 
uncover the mechanism through which these factors produce welfare generosity outputs. 
As suggested by a few studies (Barrilleaux et al., 2002; Häusermann, Picot, & Geering, 
2013), for example, parties may interact with other components of the political 






This chapter is devoted to explain connections between the empirical results from 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 and discuss pathways for future analysis. The two studies in 
these chapters look at different dimensions of state welfare policy and they show some 
commonalities and discrepancies in their results, especially regarding political forces. In 
general, partisan control plays a role to influence both welfare commitment and generosity 
at the state level. Except for the case where state welfare commitment is narrowly defined, 
whether Democrats (or Republicans for Medicaid generosity) have full control over the 
state government increases states’ willingness to devote their financial resources for public 
welfare purposes and the degree of generosity to recipients of welfare benefits. On the other 
hand, the two studies find that citizens’ ideological orientation is associated with neither 
commitment nor generosity. Although citizen liberalism moderates the effect of either 
inter-party competition or electoral competition in two generosity models (i.e., SSI-S and 
Medicaid generosity), it does not have an independent effect on the generosity. Similarly, 
the studies do not find a statistically significant effect of electoral competition in commitment 
and generosity models except for the Medicaid generosity model. Electoral competition is 
only meaningful when it is interacted with citizen liberalism in the Medicaid model.  
Meanwhile, inter-party competition and government liberalism seem to exert 
influence on welfare commitment, but they do not matter much for welfare generosity. 
Inter-party competition has the impact of increasing state welfare commitment, albeit 
with different degree, regardless of the commitment measure used. However, this same 
variable matters only when it is conditioned by citizen ideology in the SSI-S generosity 
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model. I reach a similar conclusion when it comes to the effect of government ideology. 
Government liberalism leads to an increase in welfare commitment no matter how I define 
welfare, but the only generosity model for which it shows the expected impact is the 
TANF model.   
Comparison across the results from state welfare commitment and generosity 
models raise some questions that could be further examined in the future studies. First of 
all, future research that provides theoretical underpinnings as to why some political 
variables explain state welfare commitment but not generosity and vice versa will be 
valuable. For example, inter-party competition is shown to have predicting power when it 
comes to welfare commitment but not welfare generosity at least when the independent 
effect of inter-party competition is concerned. The findings from SSI-S and Medicaid 
generosity models that show the effect of inter-party being conditioned by citizen 
ideology suggest one of the possibilities as to why we observe this discrepancy. One 
might suspect that omission of the interaction term between inter-party competition and 
citizen liberalism may lead to different findings with regard to these two factors. Whether 
it is the matter of modeling or there are indeed fundamental differences in underlying 
mechanisms in which these political variable works can be further tested. 
Next, future efforts could focus on investigating similar questions addressed in 
Chapter 4 with different measures of welfare generosity. The studies in Chapter 3 and 
Chapter 4 suggest that different political forces might come into play when other 
dimensions of the generosity of state welfare policy are taken into account. For example, 
welfare generosity can be measured to reflect the extent to which a welfare policy 
provides access to its benefits and services. Comparing results from examining different 
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dimensions of welfare generosity would help disentangling the puzzles of differential 
effects of political variables examined in these studies. 
Lastly, further empirical tests that aim to uncover the effect of 1996 welfare 
reform on state welfare policies will provide better understanding of welfare politics in 
the post-welfare reform era. Scholars have taken the opportunity that the passage of 
PRWORA created through the devolution of policy making power to states, which leads 
to many studies focusing on variation in state welfare policy since 1996. While previous 
studies draw on studies from the pre-welfare reform era, there is little attention to 
whether the politics of welfare policy in American states actually has changed since the 
1996 welfare reform. The PRWORA is viewed as the legislation that substantially 
reconstructed the U.S. welfare system, but little is known what changes the welfare 
reform brought about to the landscape of welfare policy making across states. It is 
possible that both states’ greater discretion over designing and implementing welfare 
programs and an emphasis on welfare-to-work change the political environment in which 
various factors interact to produce policy outputs. A few studies that show the effects of 
changes in social policy on political behavior suggest a possible pathway for political 
effects that is worth exploring (Clinton & Sances, 2018; Lerman, Sadin, & Trachtman, 
2017; Soss, 1999). Therefore, empirical studies comparing pre-1996 with post-1996 will 
contribute to our understanding of welfare policy making that is more relevant to the 
current policy environment. All future pathways for research suggested above will 
provide theoretical refinement and advancement in the literature, which will, in turn, 





APPENDIX A.  SUPPLEMENTS FOR CHAPTER 2 


























































































































1.00           
Female 
Legislators 0.01 1.00          
Citizen 
Liberalism 0.09 0.44 1.00         
Government 
Liberalism -0.06 0.38 0.65 1.00        
Unemploym
ent Rate 0.09 0.01 -0.02 0.07 1.00       
Unwed 
Birth Rate 0.11 -0.22 0.07 -0.00 0.37 1.00      




0.34 -0.34 -0.12 -0.06 0.22 0.47 0.28 1.00    
Hispanic 




-0.09 0.13 0.05 0.21 0.28 -0.13 -0.04 -0.12 0.03 1.00  
CCDF 
Spending -0.00 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.40 0.02 1.00 







Table A.2  Results from Different Treatment of Negative Values of the Dependent  
Variables a  
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
a. This table shows estimators from using three different data sets: negative values are (1) included as they 
are, (2) winsorized, and (3) truncated at 1 and 99 percentiles, respectively. I conduct a robustness check to 
insure that treating the nine negative values differently do not change the main results. The results for all 
the variables remain the same in terms of their statistical significance and the direction of the impact.  
b. The coefficients for CCDF Spending are statistically significant at the 1% level for first two models and 
at the 5% level for the last model, but their size is minuscule. Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret the 
result that CCDF Spending does not have a substantive marginal effect on TANF Child Care Spending. 
c. By trimming extreme values of the dependent variable at 1 and 99 percentiles, thirteen observations were 
deleted. 
Variables As is Winsor Trim 
Interaction    
Female Legislators * TANF Policy -0.38*** -0.37*** -0.26** 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) 
    
Government Policy    
State TANF Policy 8.47*** 8.30*** 6.76** 
 (2.87) (2.73) (2.69) 
    
Political Factors    
Female Legislators 0.27** 0.30*** 0.26** 
 (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) 
Citizen Liberalism 0.12** 0.13*** 0.13*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Government Liberalism 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.07*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
    
Socio-economic Factors    
Unemployment Rate -0.55* -0.57** -0.62** 
 (0.30) (0.28) (0.28) 
Unwed Birth Rate -0.16 -0.17 -0.12 
 (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) 
Poverty Rate 0.19 0.12 0.10 
 (0.23) (0.21) (0.21) 
African-American Recipients 0.04 0.06 0.07 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
Hispanic Recipients 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) 
    
Controls    
TANF Caseload Change -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) 
CCDF Spending b 6.85e-09*** 6.26e-09*** 5.57e-09** 
 (2.53e-09) (2.35e-09) (2.23e-09) 
Constant -0.45 -0.85 -1.50 
 (12.46) (12.06) (11.79) 
    
Observations 650 650 637c 
R-squared 0.84 0.85 0.84 
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APPENDIX B.  SUPPLEMENTS FOR CHAPTER 3 
B.1   Post-Estimation Diagnostic Tests for the Arellano-Bond  
One should pass two post-estimation diagnostic tests to validate the use of the 
Arellano-Bond estimator. First one is the Arellano-Bond test for autocorrelation. It tests 
the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation of order 1 and order 2 (test separately). 
For the instruments in the Arellano-Bond to work, the differenced unobserved time-
invariant error term should be unrelated to the second lag of the dependent variable and 
the lags thereafter—i.e., the order greater than 1. If this is not the case, we have 
endogeneity problem. Therefore, it is required that we fail to reject that there is no 
autocorrelation of order 2. Second one is the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions. It 
has a null hypothesis that the instruments as a group are valid, i.e., uncorrelated with the 
error term (exogenous). Therefore, we should fail to reject this hypothesis for the 
instruments in the Arellano-Bond to be valid.  
Table B.1 are the results from performing the diagnostic tests for each of the three 
models using a different dependent variable. For all three models, condition for no 
autocorrelation of order 2 is met as we cannot reject the null hypothesis of zero 
autocorrelation of order 2. However, the results from the Sargan test indicate that the 
instruments used in all models are not exogenous. It turns out that the three dependent 
variables in each model are so highly correlated individually over time that the Arellano-
Bond estimators fail the test of instrument variables being uncorrelated with error terms. 
Regressing the dependent variables on a one-year lagged dependent variable for the 
period examined shows that about 94-96% of variance in the dependent variable is 
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explained by the lagged dependent variable in all of the three models. Therefore, the 
Arellano-Bond is not an acceptable method of estimation for this study.  
Table B.1  Arellano-Bond Post-Estimation Diagnostic Tests 










AB test that autocorrelation of  
order 1 is zero (Pr>z) 0.01 0.00 0.00 
AB test that autocorrelation of  
order 2 is zero (Pr>z) 0.55 0.98 0.83 
Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions (p-value) 0.02 0.01 0.02 
 
Table B.2  Variable Definitions and Sources of Data  
Variable Measure Source 
State Welfare Commitment 
(Model 1) 
Log of per capita total state welfare 
expenditures, corresponding to 
Census measure; constant 2010 U.S. 
dollar 
Pierson K., Hand M., and 
Thompson F. (2015). The 
Government Finance Database: 
A Common Resource for 
Quantitative Research in Public 
Financial Analysis. 
U.S. Census Bureau. (1998, 
1999). State & Local 
Government Finance Historical 
Datasets and Tables (for FY 
1998 and FY 1999). 
State Welfare Commitment 
(Model 2) 
Log of per capita total state welfare 
expenditures, corresponding to 
Comprehensive measure 1; constant 
2010 U.S. dollar 
State Welfare Commitment 
(Model 3) 
Log of per capita total state welfare 
expenditures, corresponding to 
Comprehensive measure 2; constant 
2010 U.S. dollar 
Unified Democrat Control 
A dummy variable indicating 
whether both the executive and 
legislative branches are controlled by 
Democrats 
Klarner, C. (2013b). State 
Partisan Balance Data, 1937 - 
2011. 
Unified Republican Control 
A dummy variable indicating 
whether both the executive and 
legislative branches are controlled by 
Republicans 
Klarner, C. (2013b). State 
Partisan Balance Data, 1937 - 
2011. 
Inter-Party Competition 
Folded Ranney (1976) index 
indicating the degree of party control 
of, and competition between two 
parties for control of a state 
government 




Holbrook & Van Dunk (1993) index 
indicating the average of legislative 
district-level electoral competition in 
a state 







Table B.2  (continued) 
Variable Measure Source 
Government Liberalism  Berry et al. (2010) measure of 
government ideology indicating the 
relative liberalism of a state 
government  
Berry, W. D., Fording, R.C., 
Ringquist, E. J., Hanson, R. L., 
& Klarner, C. (2010). Measuring 
Citizen and Government 
Ideology in the American States: 
A Re-appraisal. 
Citizen Liberalism  Berry et al. (1998) measure of citizen 
ideology indicating the relative 
liberalism of state citizens 
Berry, W. D., Ringquist, E. J., 
Fording, R.C., & Hanson, R. L. 
(1998). Measuring Citizen and 
Government Ideology in the 
American States, 1960-93. 
Income Log of per capita state personal 
income; 2010 constant U.S dollar 
U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, U.S. Department of 
Commerce 
Unemployment  Percentage of state labor force who 
are unemployed 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Elderly Percentage of state population who 
are 65 year old and above 
U.S. Census Bureau 
African-American  Percentage of state population that is 
African-American 
U.S. Census Bureau 
Hispanic Percentage of state population that is 
Hispanic 
U.S. Census Bureau 
Poverty Percentage of state population living 
below the federal poverty level 
U.S. Census Bureau 
Federal Aid 1 
(Model 1) 
Log of per capita total federal aid 
transferred to a state, corresponding 
to Census measure; includes federal 
aid for TANF, Medicaid, care in 
nursing homes, child welfare 
services, social and community 
services block grants, etc.; 2010 
constant U.S. dollar 
Pierson K., Hand M., and 
Thompson F. (2015). The 
Government Finance Database: 
A Common Resource for 
Quantitative Research in Public 
Financial Analysis. 
Federal Aid 2 
(Model 2) 
Log of per capita total federal aid 
transferred to a state, corresponding 
to Comprehensive measure 1; 
includes Federal Aid 3 plus federal 
aid for migrant and bilingual 
education, Indian education, Head 
Start program, federal grants for 
school nutrition and milk programs, 
grants and contractual amounts 
received by higher education 







Table B.2  (continued) 
Variable Measure Source 
Federal Aid 3 
(Model 3) 
Log of per capita total federal aid 
transferred to a state, corresponding 
to Comprehensive measure 2; 
includes Federal Aid 1 plus federal 
aid for administration of the 
cooperative Federal-state 
unemployment 
compensation system, public 
employment offices and related 
services, and veterans’ readjustment 
allowances, and determination of 
eligibility for Social Security 
disability benefits; 2010 constant 
U.S. dollar 
Pierson K., Hand M., and 
Thompson F. (2015). The 
Government Finance Database: 
A Common Resource for 
Quantitative Research in Public 
Financial Analysis. 
 
Table B.3  Correlations 
(1) Between Dependent Variables in State Welfare Commitment Models 
 Census Measure Comprehensive Measure 1 
Comprehensive 
Measure 2 
Census Measure  1.00 ㅡ ㅡ 
Comprehensive Measure 1 0.90 1.00 ㅡ 
Comprehensive Measure 2 0.95 0.94 1.00 

















(2) Between Independent Variables 








































































































































Unified Dem. Control 1.00               
Unified Rep. Control -0.36 1.00              
Inter-Party Competition -0.30 -0.55 1.00             
Electoral Competition -0.10 0.03 0.05 1.00            
Government Liberalism 0.60 -0.74 0.18 0.07 1.00           
Citizen Liberalism 0.35 -0.31 0.05 0.21 0.51 1.00          
Income 0.07 -0.16 0.18 0.17 0.28 0.53 1.00         
Unemployment 0.06 -0.09 0.04 -0.11 0.11 0.03 -0.10 1.00        
Elderly 0.13 -0.07 -0.04 -0.02 0.14 0.35 -0.05 -0.07 1.00       
African-American 0.14 -0.17 0.14 -0.50 0.09 -0.12 -0.04 0.17 -0.08 1.00      
Hispanic -0.06 -0.02 0.02 -0.14 -0.03 0.06 0.12 0.14 -0.123 -0.13 1.00     
Poverty 0.06 -0.09 -0.01 -0.42 -0.02 -0.20 -0.57 0.42 0.10 0.34 0.23 1.00    
Federal Aid (Model 1) 0.16 -0.20 0.08 -0.05 0.30 0.27 -0.07 0.35 0.20 0.11 -0.13 0.40 1.00   
Federal Aid (Model 2) 0.15 -0.15 0.01 -0.03 0.26 0.22 -0.10 0.36 0.11 0.06 -0.10 0.40 0.96 1.00  
Federal Aid (Model 3) 0.16 -0.20 0.08 -0.05 0.30 0.27 -0.07 0.35 0.19 0.11 -0.13 0.40 1.00 0.96 1.00 
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APPENDIX C.  SUPPLEMENTS FOR CHAPTER 4 
C.1   Post-Estimation Diagnostic Tests for the Arellano-Bond  
Table C.1 provides the results from two post-estimation diagnostic tests which 
validate the use of the Arellano-Bond estimator. First, the Arellano-Bond test for 
autocorrelation shows whether there is no autocorrelation of order 1 and order 2, 
respectively. One should fail to reject the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation 
of order 2. If the differenced unobserved time-invariant error term is related to the second 
lag of the dependent variable and the lags thereafter, we have endogeneity, which 
indicates that the instruments in the Arellano-Bond would not work. Second, the Sargan 
test shows whether the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term, and thus valid. 
One should fail to reject this hypothesis. As shown in the table below, the use of 
Arellano-Bond estimation is validated only for SSI-S generosity.  
Table C.1  Results of Arellano-Bond Post-Estimation Diagnostic Tests 
 TANF SSI-S Medicaid 
AB test: autocorrelation of 
order 1 is zero (Pr>z) 0.22 0.08 0.01 
AB test: autocorrelation of 
order 2 is zero (Pr>z) 0.25 0.43 0.45 
Sargan test of 





Table C.2  Variable Definitions and Sources of Data  
Variable Measure Source 
TANF Generosity 
Per assistance recipient state total 
TANF assistance expenditures 
(FY1999-FY2010); constant 2010 
U.S. dollar 
Administration for Children 
and Families (ACF), U.S. 
Department of Health and 
Human Services 
SSI-S Generosity 
Per recipient state total SSI-S 
payments (FY2002-FY2004); 
constant 2010 U.S. dollar 
U.S. Social Security 
Administration 
Medicaid Generosity 
Per enrollee state total Medicaid 
expenditures (FY2002-FY2010); 
constant 2010 U.S. dollar 
Medical Statistical Information 
System (MSIS) database, 
Center for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services 
Inter-Party Competition  
Folded Ranney (1976) index 
indicating the degree of party control 
of, and competition between two 
parties for control of, a state 
government folded Ranney (1976) 
Index  
Klarner, C. (2013a) Other 
Scholars’ Competitiveness 
Measures. 
Electoral Competition  
Holbrook & Van Dunk (1993) index 
indication the average of legislative 
district-level electoral competition in 
a state  
Klarner, C. (2013a) Other 
Scholars’ Competitiveness 
Measures. 
Unified Democratic Control 
A dummy variable indicating 
whether both the executive and 
legislative branches are controlled by 
Democrats  
Klarner, C. (2013b). State 
Partisan Balance Data, 1937 - 
2011. 
Unified Republican Control 
A dummy variable indicating 
whether both the executive and 
legislative branches are controlled by 
Republicans 
Klarner, C. (2013b). State 
Partisan Balance Data, 1937 - 
2011. 
Government Liberalism  
Berry et al. (2010) measure of 
government ideology indicating the 
relative liberalism of a state 
government  
Berry, W. D., Fording, R.C., 
Ringquist, E. J., Hanson, R. L., 
& Klarner, C. (2010). 
Measuring Citizen and 
Government Ideology in the 
American States: A Re-
appraisal. 
Citizen Liberalism  
Berry et al. (2010) measure of citizen 
ideology indicating the relative 
liberalism of citizens 
Berry, W. D., Ringquist, E. J., 
Fording, R.C., & Hanson, R. 
L. (1998). Measuring Citizen 
and Government Ideology in 
the American States, 1960-93. 
Income 
Log of per capita state personal 
income; constant 2010 U.S. dollar 
U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, U.S. Department of 
Commerce 
Unemployment Percentage of state labor force who are unemployed 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Wage Log of annual earnings per worker  Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce 
Federal Share (TANF) 
Percentage of federal contribution in 
total TANF expenditures 
Administration for Children 
and Families (ACF), U.S. 




Table C.2  (continued) 
Variable Measure Source 
Federal Share (SSI-S) Percentage of federal contribution in total SSI expenditures 
U.S. Social Security 
Administration 
Federal Share (Medicaid) 
The rate at which the federal 
government match state Medicaid 
expenditures (aka FMAP) 
Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Planning and 
Evaluation, Department of 
Health and Human Services 
TANF Caseloads  
Percentage of state total annual 
TANF caseloads in total state female 
population aged 15-44 
U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services 
SSI-S Recipients Percentage of state population receiving SSI-S payments   
U.S. Social Security 
Administration 
Medicaid Enrollees 
Percentage of state population 
enrolled in Medicaid 
Medical Statistical Information 
System (MSIS) database, 
Center for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services 
Nursing Homes The number of nursing homes per 100,000 (100K) residents 
Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention 
Hospitals The number of community hospitals per 100,000 (100K) residents 
U.S. Statistical Abstract and 
Kaiser Family Foundation 
Doctors The number of physicians per 100,000 (100K) residents 
U.S. Statistical Abstract 
African-American  Percentage of state population that is African-American 
U.S. Census Bureau 
Hispanic Percentage of state population that is Hispanic 
U.S. Census Bureau 
Poverty Percentage of state population living below the federal poverty level 
Center for Poverty Research, 
University of Kentucky 
Single Mother Household  
Percentage of single mother headed 
households in a state 
U.S. Census Bureau 
Non-Marital Birth  
Percentage of births out of wed-lock 
in a state 
Kids Count Data Center 
Disability Percentage of state population who has working disabilities 
Disability Statistics, Cornell 
University 
Elderly Percentage of state population who is 65 and over  
U.S. Census Bureau 
Children Percentage of state population who is under 18 




Table C.3. Correlations Between Independent Variables 


























































































































































Inter-Party Competition 1.00                 
Electoral Competition 0.05 1.00                
Unified Dem. Control -0.30 -0.09 1.00               
Unified Rep. Control -0.55 0.03 -0.36 1.00              
Government Liberalism 0.18 0.07 0.60 -0.74 1.00             
Citizen Liberalism 0.05 0.21 0.35 -0.31 0.51 1.00            
Income 0.18 0.17 0.07 -0.16 0.28 0.53 1.00           
Wage 0.19 0.15 0.12 -0.22 0.34 0.51 0.85 1.00          
Unemployment 0.04 -0.11 0.06 -0.09 0.11 0.03 -0.10 0.15 1.00         
TANF Caseloads (t-1) 0.19 0.18 0.15 -0.33 0.38 0.36 0.08 0.29 0.05 1.00        
TANF Caseloads (t-2) 0.18 0.16 0.13 -0.29 0.33 0.32 0.06 0.25 -0.03 0.96 1.00       
Federal Share -0.10 -0.16 -0.05 -0.12 -0.21 -0.35 -0.55 -0.55 -0.02 -0.16 -0.18 1.00      
African-American 0.14 -0.50 0.14 -0.17 0.09 -0.12 -0.04 0.02 0.17 -0.12 -0.08 0.06 1.00     
Hispanic 0.02 -0.14 -0.06 -0.02 -0.03 0.06 0.12 0.23 0.14 0.11 0.10 -0.06 -0.13 1.00    
Single Mother Household 0.11 -0.33 0.07 -0.14 0.03 -0.14 -0.28 -0.19 0.21 0.09 0.11 0.20 0.50 -0.05 1.00   
Non-Marital Birth 0.18 -0.41 0.10 -0.22 0.18 0.12 -0.12 -0.15 0.37 0.04 0.02 0.10 0.53 0.20 0.49 1.00  
Poverty -0.01 -0.42 0.06 -0.09 -0.02 -0.20 -0.57 -0.45 0.42 0.05 0.05 0.37 0.34 0.23 0.44 0.58 1.00 
Note: All variables except TANF Caseloads (t-2) are lagged by one year. Correlation values are rounded to the second decimal number.  
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SSI-S (t-1) 1.00                  
Inter-Party Competition 0.22 1.00                 
Electoral Competition 0.10 0.10 1.00                
Unified Dem. Control 0.04 -0.28 -0.26 1.00               
Unified Rep. Control -0.18 -0.53 0.11 -0.32 1.00              
Government Liberalism 0.27 0.21 0.04 0.52 -0.69 1.00             
Citizen Liberalism 0.04 0.17 0.17 0.26 -0.31 0.47 1.00            
Income 0.22 0.27 0.21 -0.04 -0.13 0.25 0.49 1.00           
Wage 0.31 0.25 0.22 0.02 -0.15 0.33 0.48 0.89 1.00          
Unemployment 0.17 0.07 -0.06 0.05 -0.05 0.13 -0.16 -0.20 0.13 1.00         
SSI-S Recipients (t-1) -0.12 0.10 0.23 -0.02 -0.05 0.24 0.43 0.45 0.50 0.01 1.00        
SSI-S Recipients (t-2) -0.04 0.08 0.26 0.01 -0.06 0.25 0.45 0.46 0.52 0.03 0.98 1.00       
Federal Share -0.16 0.09 -0.30 0.13 0.02 -0.16 -0.18 -0.44 -0.49 -0.11 -0.64 -0.62 1.00      
African-American 0.04 -0.14 -0.49 0.28 -0.21 0.21 -0.14 -0.02 0.00 0.16 -0.28 -0.30 0.24 1.00     
Hispanic -0.06 0.06 -0.06 -0.15 -0.08 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.18 0.22 0.05 0.04 -0.03 -0.16 1.00    
Disability -0.05 -0.06 -0.15 0.30 -0.13 0.20 -0.11 -0.51 -0.42 0.26 -0.06 -0.06 0.22 0.15 -0.34 1.00   
Elderly -0.17 -0.05 -0.11 0.10 -0.08 0.04 0.36 -0.04 -0.21 -0.28 0.02 0.03 0.21 -0.06 -0.21 0.28 1.00  
Poverty -0.13 -0.11 -0.45 0.22 -0.18 0.12 -0.20 -0.66 -0.49 0.40 -0.23 -0.24 0.33 0.33 0.22 0.59 0.11 1.00 








































































































































































Inter-Party Competition 1.00                    
Electoral Competition 0.06 1.00                   
Unified Dem. Control -0.31 -0.06 1.00                  
Unified Rep. Control -0.52 0.00 -0.36 1.00                 
Government Liberalism 0.16 0.08 0.61 -0.74 1.00                
Citizen Liberalism 0.04 0.23 0.35 -0.35 0.53 1.00               
Nursing Homes -0.10 0.14 -0.10 0.09 -0.08 -0.06 1.00              
Hospitals -0.23 0.18 -0.18 0.31 -0.25 -0.30 0.74 1.00             
Doctors 0.04 0.04 0.33 -0.30 0.44 0.75 -0.17 -0.43 1.00            
Income 0.16 0.17 0.11 -0.17 0.29 0.52 -0.20 -0.37 0.69 1.00           
Unemployment 0.06 -0.10 0.05 -0.07 0.09 -0.02 -0.26 -0.25 0.00 -0.16 1.00          
Medicaid Enrollees (t-1) 0.08 -0.30 0.15 -0.27 0.28 0.15 -0.11 -0.13 0.09 -0.23 0.28 1.00         
Medicaid Enrollees (t-2) 0.07 -0.29 0.16 -0.25 0.28 0.16 -0.12 -0.12 0.10 -0.21 0.25 0.96 1.00        
Federal Share -0.23 -0.22 -0.04 0.16 -0.22 -0.44 0.27 0.47 -0.57 -0.88 0.03 0.31 0.31 1.00       
African-American 0.12 -0.52 0.11 -0.13 0.04 -0.14 -0.26 -0.32 0.07 -0.05 0.20 0.28 0.27 0.07 1.00      
Hispanic -0.03 -0.16 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.44 -0.37 -0.01 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.09 -0.16 -0.13 1.00     
Disability 0.07 -0.18 0.18 -0.18 0.17 -0.07 0.07 0.13 -0.16 -0.45 0.24 0.50 0.51 0.53 0.22 -0.34 1.00    
Elderly -0.01 0.01 0.13 -0.16 0.20 0.36 0.46 0.18 0.16 -0.05 -0.07 0.11 0.11 0.14 -0.08 -0.24 0.27 1.00   
Children -0.14 -0.10 -0.30 0.33 -0.42 -0.60 -0.17 0.03 -0.45 -0.29 -0.00 -0.12 -0.14 0.21 0.04 0.29 -0.31 -0.75 1.00  
Poverty -0.02 -0.44 0.05 -0.08 -0.02 -0.24 -0.04 0.10 -0.29 -0.60 0.40 0.58 0.56 0.62 0.37 0.21 0.55 0.10 0.07 1.00 
Note: The statistics are for original variables, not differenced variables. All variables except Medicaid Enrollees (t-2) are lagged by one year. Correlation values 
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